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POLITICAL BARGAINING AND JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ANTITRUST FEDERALISM
JIM ROSSI*
ABSTRACT

Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center
of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition

policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to
develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of
judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state-action
immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network
industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share
a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on
the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local
lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose of deterring
the adoption of regulations with adverse spillover effects for those who do
not participate in the relevant lawmaking process. The Article illustrates
how a political process bargaining approach to these doctrines differs in its
recommendations from traditional formulations, with implications for the
degree of deference courts afford state and local laws.
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INTRODUCTION

Defining the scope of state and local regulation is one of the most
difficult questions public law confronts in the context of competition
policy. Its implications take on particular significance as we partially
"deregulate" (or, perhaps more politically correctly, "restructure")
industries such as electric power and telecommunications.' Given a strong
tradition of state and local economic regulation, reinforced by partial
federal jurisdiction over many regulatory problems, bargaining over the
content 2of regulation is frequently left to the spheres of state and local
politics.

1. Along these lines, the use of "deregulation" in this Article is not intended to imply complete
dismantling of regulation, but discarding certain features of traditional regulation, such as cost-ofservice ratemaking. Frequently, partial regulation of industries such as electric power and
telecommunications remain long after these industries are deregulated. Deregulation generally entails
disentangling network characteristics of these industries from their competitive sectors, and regulation
of networks by federal, state and local governments remains active, even in the most "deregulated"
environments. As Alfred Kahn has stated, "[t]he decision to regulate never represents a clean break
with competition." 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 113 (1988). So too, the
decision to embrace competition in these industries never represents a clean break with regulation. See
PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC
UTILITY DEREGULATION 211-12 (1983) (concluding: "[o]ur analysis leads us to conclude that any
sensible deregulation scheme will require continuing economic regulation of some segments of the
electric power system."); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 272 (2000) (discussing the regulatory issues for deregulated
telecommunications markets).
2. Regulation operates along both horizontal dimensions, in which different territories at the
same hierarchical level assert jurisdiction vis-A-vis each other, and vertical dimensions, in which
different hierarchical levels of government-federal, state, and local-lay claim to regulatory power.
The classic formulation is to see federal-state jurisdictional issues through the lens of vertical power or
bargaining conflicts. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 52-53 (2003); Jim Chen, The Vertical Dimension of
Cooperative Competition Policy, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 1005 (2003). For a broader discussion of the
implications of such conceptualization for the enforcement of constitutional rights in public law, see
Stephen Gardbaum, The "HorizontalEffect" of ConstitutionalRights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003).
Gardbaum rejects the "vertical" conceptualization of constitutional rights enforcement under the state
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The continued relevance of state and local politics leaves regulatory
law in a schizophrenic balance. Given the tradition of active state
regulation of natural monopoly in industries such as electric power and
telecommunications (in the form of "public utility" regulation, which
frequently involved the setting of rates), 3 firms in newly restructured
markets are regularly placed in situations in which there is a jurisdictional
gap (i.e., no regulation of private conduct) or in which there is concurrent
jurisdiction between federal and state agencies (i.e., two or more potential
regulators).4 Several leading scholars argue that state and local regulation
is fundamentally inconsistent with competitive interstate markets, and that
perhaps courts should err on the side of expansive interpretation of federal
regulatory authority to strengthen competition policies.5
This Article departs from such recommendations by looking inward at
states, rather than outward to-and upward at-federal law.6 As this
Article discusses, jurisdictional gaps and overlaps present private firms
with many opportunities for strategic manipulation in bargaining for

action doctrine to conclude that "[p]rivate choices are always indirectly subject to the Constitution
whenever an individual relies on the law to protect or enforce them, because the Constitution applies
directly to that law." Id.at 458-59.
3. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1363-64 (1998); see also Jim Chen, The Nature of the
Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1617, 1679 (2004)
(reviewing JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND
DISCRETION (2003) (describing the history of rate regulation)).
4. See Buzbee, supra note 2 (focusing on the jurisdictional problem of federal-state overlaps,
which he refers to as the "regulatory commons").
5. See Richard D. Cudahy, Full Circle in the Formerly Regulated Industries?,33 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 767 (2002). Judge Richard Cudahy sees federal regulation of electric power transmission as "more
or less inherent in the scheme of deregulation and competition, which depends for its functioning upon
widespread access to the transmission network." Id. at 778. Richard Pierce embraces expanded
congressional authorization for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to resolve
transmission-siting disputes, noting the inevitable incentives states face to erect impediments to
interstate commerce. Richard J.Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy & Market Entry, 15
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y FORUM (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Pierce, EnvironmentalRegulation].
For more than a decade, Pierce has been arguing for the same basic congressional solution. See
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and
Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323 (1994) [hereinafter Pierce, Competitive Markets]. Jim Chen advocates
increased federal authority over telecommunications for similar reasons. Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural
Telephony and the Public Interest: A Case Study in Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J.ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 307 (2003).

6. Hence, its analysis joins issue with those who wish to unpack the black box of state and local
government. As the recent turn to focus on state and local governance chronicles, states are complex
and nuanced regulatory systems whose governance features should not be ignored. See, e.g., Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. I
(1990); Clayton P. Gillette, In PartialPraise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify
Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1991).
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regulation at the state and local levels. 7 Rather than looking to federal
preemption as a solution, I argue that legal doctrines focused on state and
local lawmaking can improve competition policy in emerging markets.
However, the response of public law to the opportunities faced by private
firms in state and local lawmaking must be something more than the
predominant judicial stance of deference to decentralized politics.
As James Madison recognized long ago in FederalistNo. 10, the state
political process is prone to abuses, particularly given the lower costs8
firms face in manipulating state and local, as opposed to federal, politics.
If, for example, a state government has the authority to refuse imports
from other jurisdictions, that state also has the power to influence an
industry far beyond the state's own jurisdictional borders, shaping firmspecific structure, contracting, and other governance issues. Public law
doctrines delineating the appropriate balance of powers between the state
and federal spheres of regulation have significant implications for industry
in the U.S., as well as for the law regarding competition policy.
These concerns are most significant in the doctrinal contexts of the
dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution and state-action
immunity from antitrust enforcement. 9 Part I of this Article presents a
bargaining account of the dormant commerce clause, in which its primary
purpose is understood as protecting against the imposition of spillover
costs on those not afforded the opportunity to participate in state and local
political processes. On the conventional understanding, barrier-free
markets between the states form the core of dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence.' ° However, in contrast to this external market approach,
Part I suggests that the dormant commerce clause is concerned with
political, not only market, failure. The dormant commerce clause responds
to a type of incompleteness in political bargaining-due to transaction
costs, states may find it difficult to bargain with each other to ensure that

7. The account of regulation as bargaining is laid out more fully in JIM Rossi, REGULATORY
BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW (Cambridge University Press 2005). The effort focuses on developing
a robust understanding of how bargaining and regulation interrelate, in a way that acknowledges
incentives in the lawmaking process and the role of institutions. This account contrasts with the
accounts presented by traditional progressives, who embrace the public interest as the animating goal
of state regulation, and public-choice theorists, who are cynical about regulation generally, but
especially suspicious of state and local regulation.
8.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

9. "State-action immunity," a judicially created antitrust defense, differs in purposes and origins
from the "state action doctrine," which controls the extent to which constitutional-rights protections
may be invoked against states or private actors. See Gardbaum, supra note 2.
10. See infra Part L.A (presenting the traditional neoclassical account of the dormant commerce
clause, which protects the external competitive marketplace, and contrasting it with a political process
understanding, which is more focused on cooperative bargaining).
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trade barriers are not harmful to overall social welfare. An individual
state's approach to monopoly regulation risks imposing spillover costs on
other jurisdictions; by striking state legislation that is likely to impose such
costs, the dormant commerce clause internalizes these spillover effects in
order to improve the state political process. Part I illustrates the
significance of this conception of the dormant commerce clause for
competition policy in newly reconstituted industries, such as electric
power and telecommunications.
Part II of the Article addresses state-action immunity-a common
defense to antitrust enforcement where a state or local government actively
regulates a firm. For example, price-regulated public utilities, including
electric-power and telecommunications monopolies, have long escaped
judicial antitrust scrutiny of their regulated activities. For most of the
twentieth century, rate hearings before state and local regulatory
commissions alone served to police the exercise of market power. Here, a
tension with the dormant commerce clause seems apparent: While in spirit
the dormant commerce clause is pro-competitive (and hence antiprotectionist), state-action immunity from antitrust enforcement is proregulation, a potential contrast in goal and approach."1
But, as Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, "Regulation by state and
local government is not only pervasive, but it is also probably more
susceptible to political influences than federal regulation is.' 12 Part II of
this Article advises that courts approach judicial gatekeeping in the
antitrust context with extreme caution in emerging competitive markets.
Once widely taken for granted by firms in the electric-power and
telecommunications industries, state-action immunity should no longer
automatically bar antitrust suits in utility industries. With deregulation,
there is widespread recognition that antitrust laws may play an
increasingly important role in deregulated industries, such as
telecommunications, electric power, and natural gas.13 However, as Part II
illustrates, courts embrace overbroad deference and have failed to take a
principled approach to deciding when to intervene rather than grant stateaction immunity in antitrust claims against utility industries. According to

11. Put another way, one doctrine is oriented towards free trade, while another favors-and may
even encourage-state-sanctioned monopoly.
12.

Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise,2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.

335,346.
13.

See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 748 (2004) (arguing that

"as economic regulation has evolved it no longer makes sense to treat antitrust and regulation as
separate bodies of doctrine-unified, they should form the building blocks of a new competition
law.").
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a recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Office of Policy Planning task
force report on the topic, "the state action doctrine has come to pose a
serious impediment to achieving national competition policy goals. 14
Part III of this Article argues that a principled approach to state-action
immunity would not embrace strong deference to decentralized lawmaking
but would interpret this defense to antitrust enforcement in a manner
similar to the political process bargaining account of the dormant
commerce clause. However, the doctrinal convergence between the
Constitution and antitrust federalism is not limited to pro-competitive
policies that promote commercial exchange. A political process bargaining
approach to these two doctrines illustrates their unified purpose of limiting
the negative impact of interest-group capture of the state regulatory
process, without completely prohibiting rent-seeking behavior. At their
core, as Part III suggests, the fundamental goal of both doctrines is to
protect a political process that facilitates regulatory bargaining by
tempering self-interested interference that imposes spillover costs on nonparticipants in the relevant bargaining process. This has important
implications for courts' approaches to considering state-action immunity
and, specifically, for the judicial inquiry into the nature of regulatory
supervision at the state and local level.
As both constitutional and antitrust-federalism doctrines illustrate, in
the context of economic regulation the judicial role requires something
more than deference to decentralized politics. Public law, and in particular
judicial review, should police private strategic manipulation of the
political process in ways that are likely to impose spillover costs on nonparticipants in considering dormant commerce clause challenges to state
and local lawmakers. For the same reason, courts must play an important
gatekeeping role in policing antitrust enforcement by allowing the stateaction-immunity defense only where adequate safeguards against welfarereducing private conduct are in place.
I. A BARGAINING PROCESS ACCOUNT OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE

At its most general level, the dormant commerce clause limits the
power of a state or local government to impair free trade. 1 5 Derived from

14.

OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK

FORCE 25 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O03/09/stateactionreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC
STATE ACTION REPORT].

15. The evolution of the dormant commerce clause as a constitutional doctrine can be traced to
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the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 16 the dormant commerce clause
precludes a state from enacting barriers to interstate commerce that are
blatantly discriminatory against out-of-state businesses, or which have the
effect of bringing about such discrimination. 17 As Oliver Wendell Holmes
once remarked:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union
would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the
laws of the several States. For one in my place sees how often a
local policy prevails with those who are not trained to national
views and how often action is taken that embodies what the
Commerce Clause was meant to end.1 8
Although it is not an express mandate of the text of the U.S.
Constitution's Commerce Clause (hence its common reference as the
"negative" commerce clause),' 9 the jurisprudence of the dormant
commerce clause has long recognized this overall purpose. As Justice
Cardozo famously remarked in striking down a New York law that set
minimum prices all milk dealers were required to pay New York milk
producers, the Commerce Clause prohibits a state law that burdens
interstate commerce "when the avowed purpose of the [law], as well as its

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.). Examples of the doctrine being used to strike down offending
state and local programs abound. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981);
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); S.Pac. Co. v. Arizona
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
16. The Commerce Clause provides that "(tihe Congress shall have Power ...To regulate
Commerce ...among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
17. The "dormant" commerce clause embodies the notion that the grant of authority to Congress
to regulate interstate commerce carries with it implied restrictions on the ability of states to initiate
regulations affecting interstate commerce.
18.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).

19. Among skeptical textualists, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, the doctrine is commonly
referred to as the "negative" commerce clause, indicating the lack of express textual basis for it in the
Constitution. See Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: CongressionalAcquiescence and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1765-66 (2004). Skeptics believe that the purposes of the
dormant commerce clause can readily be served by other, more textually explicit, constitutional
doctrines, such as the Import-Export Clause of Article I, Section 10 or the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2. These alternatives are not without their own critics. See, e.g., Brannon
P. Denning, Justice Thomas, The Import-Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison,
70 U. COL. L. REV. 155 (1999); Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384 (2003).
However, for purposes of this Article, let it suffice it to emphasize that the alternatives would make
protections against interstate regulatory barriers much narrower.
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necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of
competition between the states., 20 This general principle was also invoked
to strike a New York regulatory scheme that had been used to deny a
license to an out-of-state milk-processing facility. 2' Since the licensing
provision had been enacted "solely [for] protection of local economic
interests, such as supply for local consumption and limitation of
competition," it was found to be unconstitutional.22
A. Bargaining,Spillover Costs, and InterstateCommerce
City of Philadephiav. New Jersey,23 a well-known case addressing how
the dormant commerce clause limits state regulation of waste disposal,
illustrates the modem doctrine courts apply to further the purpose of
protecting the external market. New Jersey prohibited the importation of
most "solid or liquid waste" originating out of state.24 The statute was first
challenged in state court, but the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
law against a dormant commerce clause challenge, concluding that it
"advanced vital health and environmental objectives., 25 New Jersey,
however, had failed to present any evidence that out-of-state garbage was
more noxious than in-state garbage.2 6 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stewart asserted that "where simple economic protectionism is effected by
state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected., 27 As
the Court noted in City of Philadelphia,even if the New Jersey statute was
not per se invalid, it would not necessarily withstand constitutional
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. 28 Instead, the Court would evaluate
it under an alternative line of analysis: "Where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits., 29 The Supreme Court struck down the New Jersey
statute as a violation of the dormant commerce clause, but did not clearly
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Inc., 397

Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949).
Id.
at531.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Id. at 618.
Id. at 620.
Id.at629.
Id.at624.
Id.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church,
U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
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state which of these two rules-per se invalidity or balancing-it
applied.
While City of Philadelphiaand earlier cases suggest a fairly aggressive
level of judicial intervention in evaluating state and local laws under the
Constitution, 3' many of the most protectionist laws have avoided dormant
commerce clause scrutiny altogether. In comparison to non-regulated
industries, in which norms of competition prevail, dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence played little historical role in defining the overall
shape of heavily regulated industries, such as electric power and
telecommunications.3 2 For instance, throughout the twentieth century, the
electric power industry was dominated by cost-of-service regulated
utilities.33 Frequently, the sales jurisdiction of these firms was limited to
specific state and local service territories. 34 Both retail and wholesale
transactions were price regulated, based on the cost of service. 35 With such
a regulatory framework in place, any notion of competition between
suppliers is largely meaningless. Since a cost-of-service regulated industry
is not in an open market in which competition can thrive, protecting
interstate competition is of little concern. To the extent that there is any
competition at all, it is largely limited to the political process of
determining the applicability and scope of monopoly franchises. 36 Not
surprisingly, dormant commerce clause challenges to public utility laws in
the twentieth century were infrequent-nearly nonexistent. 37 When
challenges were38brought, federal courts typically deferred to state and
local regulation.

30.
31.

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627-29 (1978).
In fact, recently the U.S. Supreme Court has followed the lead of lower courts, which

embrace the dormant commerce clause to suggest that state laws banning direct shipment of wine from
out-of-state distributors, but allowing in-state distributors to ship wine, present serious dormant
commerce clause problems. See Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005); see also Beskind v.
Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11 th Cir. 2002); Cooper v.
McBeath, 11 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 1994); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002);
Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2002).

32. To the extent there was no interstate trade in electric power subject to state jurisdiction, the
opportunity for state regulators to interfere with interstate commerce was non-existent.
33. RICHARD F. HIRSCH, THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 40-46 (1999).
34. Id. See also ROSSI, supranote 7, at 177.
35. See, e.g., JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE:
MONOPOLY,

CONTRACTS AND DISCRETION (2003). See also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3.
36. See Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, in
THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER

INDUSTRY, 43, 52-61 (Peter Z. Grossman & David M. Cole eds., 2003).
37.

See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.

38.

A classic precedent, which formed the basis for much of twentieth century state regulation of
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However, as formerly regulated markets are deregulated, the
introduction of competition changes the status quo, introducing a new
vigor to dormant commerce clause challenges to public utility laws. For
instance, since the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
deregulated wholesale electric power markets in the 1990s, 39 interstate
competition between firms in the power supply market has emerged.4 °
Many states have further deregulated the retail side of electric power
(California most famously, but other states such as Texas as well), but
most states continue to depend on heavy state and local regulation of the
industry. 41 Against this backdrop, certain regulatory actions by a state or
local government are constitutionally doubtful. For instance, if an
individual state adopts a moratorium on the siting of new power plants or
interstate transmission lines that are intended to provide service in
wholesale (interstate) electric supply markets (as, in fact, several states
have), this raises serious concerns under the dormant commerce clause.42
In addition, as other authors have noted, state-imposed subsidies and
rebates designed to encourage renewable power or environmental
conservation may also pose a problem under the dormant commerce clause
in a deregulated environment.43 For example, a tax that is imposed on all

public utilities, is Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), which upheld legislative approval ofjoint price
agreement by grain elevators in Chicago against a dormant commerce clause challenge, given concern
with regulating a common carier as a monopoly in the "public interest." See also Saul Levmore,
InterstateExploitation andJudicialIntervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563, 610 (1983) ("In examining local
regulations, courts should be more suspicious of those imposing substantial costs out-of-state than
those placing costs primarily within the legislating jurisdiction.").
39. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,

61 FED. REG. 21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 CFR pts. 35, 385) [hereinafter Promoting
Wholesale Competition].
40. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE, ch. 7 (Oct. 2000), available at
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/elecricity/chg-strujupdate/toc.html [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
UPDATE].
41. Id.ch. 8.
42. Of course, many state and local governments have adopted moratoria on economic
development and growth generally, and these may raise some legitimate concerns under the dormant
commerce clause, but power plant and transmission line siting moratoria pose a more specific
problem. Concerned with their states becoming transmission superhighways or power plant siting
grounds for others, many states have considered or adopted such moratoria. See, e.g., Conn. Governor
Signs Moratoriumon Grid Projects, Keeping Cross Sound in Limbo, POWER MARKETS WK., June 30,
2003, at 31 [hereinafter Moratorium on Grid Projects] (describing Connecticut's moratorium on new
transmission lines); Florida County Imposes Power Plant Moratorium, ELECTRICITY DAILY, July 2,
2001, at I (describing a Broward County, Florida, moratorium that stalled a 511 megawatt merchant
power plant that had been approved by city officials in Deerfield Beach, Florida).
43. See Kristen H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based

Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999);
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power sales in a state but redistributed to favor only in-state suppliers may
present constitutional problems. Given these changes to regulation, courts
need to reassess the scope of deference afforded to state and local
regulation of network industries under the dormant commerce clause.
Since the 1980s, when deregulation took hold in a variety of industries,
the Supreme Court has had several occasions to address the appropriate
level of judicial deference under the dormant commerce clause. One of its
cases on the topic, General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,4 evaluated Ohio's
differential tax burdens for in-state and out-of-state gas suppliers. Ohio
had levied a five percent tax on all natural gas transactions except those
involving local distribution companies (LDCs), which serve as an
intermediary between end users and natural gas suppliers.45 Under Ohio's
natural gas tax, only in-state utilities qualified as tax-exempt LDCs, so
Ohio's tax scheme effectively subjected in-state and out-of-state natural
gas suppliers to different tax burdens.4 6 The Court acknowledged that such
a discriminatory scheme could violate the dormant commerce clause, but
refused to find a violation of the dormant commerce clause on the
particular facts that had been raised.4 7 General Motors, which mounted a
legal challenge to Ohio's differential tax, was a large enough customer to
purchase its gas on the open market rather than bundled from a regulated
LDC.4 8 Absent competition between the LDC and the open market serving
General Motors, the Court reasoned, "there can be no local preference,
whether by express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue
49
burden upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply.,
Other cases extend the reach of the dormant commerce clause beyond
merely protecting external (interstate) markets. In C&A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown,50 the Supreme Court invalidated a municipallyimposed monopoly over non-recyclable solid waste collected for
processing and transfer. To guarantee a minimum stream of revenues for
the project, the Town of Clarkstown, New York adopted a flow control
ordinance, allowing the private operator of a transfer station to collect a
fee of $81 per ton-in excess of the disposal cost of solid waste in the

Steven Ferrey, Renewable Subsidies in the Age of Deregulation,PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 1997,
at 22.
44. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
45. Id. at 281-82.
46. Id. at 282-83.
47. Id. at 310.
48. Id. at 301.
49. Id. at 300.
50. C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
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private market." C&A Carbone, Inc. processed solid waste and operated a
recycling center, as it was permitted to do under the Clarkstown flow
control ordinance.52 The flow control ordinance required companies like
Carbone to bring nonrecylable waste to the locally-franchised transfer
station and to pay a fee, while prohibiting them from shipping the waste
themselves. 53 "[A] financing measure," the flow control ordinance ensured
that "the town-sponsored facility will be profitable, so that the local
contractor can build it and Clarkstown can buy it back at nominal cost in
five years. 54 The Court reasoned that the local law violates the dormant
commerce clause because in "practical effect and design" it bars out-ofstate sanitary landfill operators from participating in the local market for
solid waste disposal. 55 In so reasoning, the majority drew from a 1925
case, written by Justice Brandeis, which held that a statute prohibiting
"common carriers from using state highways over certain routes without a
certificate" of convenience and necessity is unconstitutional. 6
If a municipal government itself were to create and own the facility,
this would bring the monopoly within an exception to the dormant
commerce clause known as the market-participant exception.57 In creating
monopolies, however, local governments frequently work with private
firms, using the advantages of the state-subsidies, below-market interest
rates from non-taxable bonds, bypassing state or local restrictions on use
of municipal tax powers, etc.-to assist firms and create incentives for
them to provide service. Since municipal governments often help to pay
for even private infrastructure, such as waste disposal facilities, through
the issuance of bonds, it is understandable that a local government might
want to create a monopoly to ensure that its facility maintains sufficient
revenues to cover its costs and to avoid jeopardizing the government's

51. Id. at 386-87.
52. Id. at 387-88.
53. Id. at 388.
54. Id.at 393.
55. Id.at 389, 394.
56. Id. at 394 (quoting Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925)). Justice Brandeis
wrote for the Court:
[The statute's] primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety or to conservation of
the highways, but the prohibition of competition. It determines not the manner of use, but the
persons by whom the highways may be used. It prohibits such use to some persons while
permitting it to others for the same purpose and in the same manner.
Buck, 267 U.S. at 315-16.
57. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-39 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 808-10 (1976). For a survey of the academic literature on the market-participant
exception, see Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989).
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bond rating. Such facilities are allowed to collect charges, which serve the
same basic function as a tax. If the government itself were to build, own
and operate a facility, the political process would impose a general tax, but
with private operations subsidized by a state- or locally-enforced
monopoly, the tax implications of such projects are obscured. The Town
of Clarkstown, New York, for example, guaranteed revenue for its solid
waste transfer station-it promised a minimum of 120,000 tons of waste
per year, allowing the firm to make more than $9.7 million in annual
revenue for five years-and agreed to buy it for $1 at the end of the
contract period.18 One way of understanding the Court's rejection of the
Clarkstown flow control ordinance is based on its concerns with
impermissible government-assisted monopolies against the backdrop of
interstate competition.5 9
The basic touchstone guiding judicial intervention under the guise of
the dormant commerce clause is commonly described as protecting the
60
market against discrimination between in- and out-of-state competitors.
If recent decisions are taken at face value as supporting such a conception,
the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence might be
said to embrace a pro-competition stance, consistent with the ideology and
goals of the neoclassical economics framework, in which law sees its
primary role as intervening to correct for market failure. In Tracy, for
example, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated: "The dormant
commerce clause protects markets and participants in markets, not
taxpayers as such.",6 1 He bolstered this vision of the dormant commerce
clause by referencing the famous words of Justice Jackson:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no
home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will
by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing

58. 511 U.S. at 387.
59. The market-participant exception does not preclude a Commerce Clause challenge to such a
facility because the exception is limited and is not automatically available where the state could
expand into the market. To avail itself of the market-participant exception, the state must establish that
it is a market participant and may not use mere contractual privity to immunize downstream regulatory
conduct in a market in which it is not a direct participant. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82 (1984).
60. Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1191, 1222-23 (1998).

61.

General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997).

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:521

area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such
was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this
Court which has given it reality.62
This neoclassical view of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence sees
the role of federal courts as prohibiting states from interfering with the
economic exchange of a free market economy.6 3 On this view, the primary
purpose of judicial intervention is to guard against state and local
government balkanization by protecting free trade from state government
interference in the external market.
However, it is misleading to read the dormant commerce clause as a
constitutional mandate for competition, let alone deregulation. As dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence itself recognizes, there are exceptions to
the dormant commerce clause where the state itself takes on the role of
market participant.64 Further, the dormant commerce clause allows
substantial state government intervention in the setting of prices, subsidies,
and taxes, so long as a state does not engage in differential treatment in the
same market in ways that burden interstate competition.6 5 Moreover, since
the dormant commerce clause is not derived from the express language of
the U.S. Constitution, Congress retains the power to override it by
adopting a national policy that preempts, or overrides, the competitive
market between individual states. 66 For example, under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has the express authority to establish an agency such as
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), giving it jurisdiction to
regulate railroad rates previously left to individual states. 67 Congress also
may authorize national ownership of infrastructure, as it did in creating the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and countless other national firms, and
may opt to preclude competition in an industry altogether. 68 "Our
Constitution," the late Julian Eule has written, "did not attempt to solve
economic parochialism by an express prohibition against interference with

62. Id. at 299-300 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)).
63. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982); Steven G. Gey, The PoliticalEconomy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 1 (1989-90); McGreal, supranote 60.
64. See supra notes 57 and 59.
65. See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
66. See Chen, supra note 19.
67.

For discussion, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937,

at 164-67 (1991).
68. For discussion, see Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory
Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1451-52 (2000).
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free trade. Instead, it shifted legislative power over economic matters that
affect more than one state to a single national body. 69
To take a more modern example than the now-defunct ICC railroad
regulation regime or TVA, Congress has created FERC, which has made a
major policy choice to implement competitive regional wholesale power
markets.7 ° Congress has the power to override FERC's decision, but
despite concerns with state-led regulatory policies, as in California, no one
has seriously proposed a congressional repeal of national deregulation
policies in electric power. Alternatively, as others have proposed,
Congress might expand FERC's jurisdiction, taking some or all regulatory
authority over retail markets away from state regulators.7 If Congress
were to do so, by occupying the lawmaking field it might preclude states
from enacting some laws that discriminate against out-of-state suppliers in
deregulated wholesale markets. But-and this remains an important source
of legitimacy for the dormant commerce clause-Congress has not done
so.72 Congress's inaction, however, does not mean that preemption plays
no role in this context. In a sense, Congress's acquiescence in FERC's
competitive policies preempts individual states from acting in ways that
impair commerce between the states. Absent a change in federal policy,
state efforts to curtail competition in wholesale electric power markets
could be suspect under the dormant commerce clause to the extent that
they undermine the interstate markets created by FERC.
While a federal preemption argument for interstate market norms is
based in a positive legal source of congressional or federal agency
enactments which preclude contrary state laws, preservation of the status
quo under the dormant commerce clause also finds some source in the
cooperative behavior between two or more states that have adopted a
competitive norm of exchange in which Congress acquiesces. Many have
suggested that the neoclassical account of the dormant commerce clauseas a legal source of free trade policies between the states-is flawed.73 An
alternative view understands judicial intervention under the dormant

69. Eule, supranote 63, at 430.
70. See Promoting Wholesale Competition,supra note 39.
71. See, e.g., Pierce, Competitive Markets, supra note 5 (proposing increased federal authority
over transmission line siting).
72. As Jim Chen observes:
Congress's persistent failure to repeal the dormant Commerce Clause is the singularly
impressive feature of American constitutionalism's approach to protecting free trade. Though
it has failed to win academic support, congressional silence provides at least an adequate and
perhaps even a persuasive case for preserving the dormant Commerce Clause.
Chen, supra note 19, at 1769.
73. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 63.
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commerce clause not as inherently protecting competition itself, let alone
free markets, but as protecting a political process that makes markets
possible. On this view, the dormant commerce clause is as much about
political failures as it is about market failure.
For instance, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,7 4 the Supreme
Court struck down a Massachusetts tax and rebate scheme for milk that
operated neutrally without regard to the milk's place of origin because the
tax revenue went into a subsidy fund distributed solely to Massachusetts
milk producers. In writing for the majority, Justice Stevens embraced a
political process account of the dormant commerce clause, in which its
role is seen as representative-enforcing in a manner similar to United
States v. Carolene Product's famous footnote four.75 As Justice Stevens
remarked in striking down the tax and subsidy regime in West Lynn
Creamery:
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here,
are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate
commerce, in part because "[t]he existence of major in-state
interests adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against
legislative abuse." However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is
coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State's
political process can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative
abuse, because one of the in-state interests which would otherwise
lobby against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.76
Rather than inherently protecting competition and free markets, the
purposes of dormant commerce clause doctrine can be understood within
the frameworks of Madisonian democracy as well as efficiencyspecifically, as limiting welfare-reducing interest-group rent-seeking in the
state regulatory process.
This political process account of the dormant commerce clause
converges with a bargaining approach that understands lawmaking as a
type of negotiated, but incomplete, contract. The Compact Clause of the
Constitution prevents states from entering into bilateral or multilateral
agreements absent congressional approval.7 7 Even absent formal

74. 512 U.S. 186(1994).
75. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). John Hart Ely has applied the
representation-reinforcing role of Carolene Products to equal protection jurisprudence. See JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

76. 512 U.S. at 200 (alterations in original) (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)).
77. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl.3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ...enter
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agreement under the Compact Clause, states may informally undertake a
coordinated pro-commerce regime. 78 In this scenario, a single state-or
powerful interest groups within a single state-may seek to appropriate
rents by enacting legislation that is intended to defeat the coordinated
regime. 79 The commons problems 8° created by jurisdictional overlaps
between federal and state regulation create a need for gap-filling measures
but also simultaneously provide the opportunity for powerful firms to
influence the state lawmaking process to advance their self-interest.
Individual state defectors can cause a divergence between ex ante and ex
post expectations in maintaining the implicit cooperative norm between
the states.
Drawing from this basic account of interstate coordination, Paul
McGreal has argued that the dormant commerce clause is best understood
as a solution to a Prisoner's Dilemma defection, where individual states
(as well as the interest groups which demand state regulation) stand to
gain by defecting rather than cooperating with market exchange norms. 8 1
Maxwell Steams takes this argument a step further, presenting the
coordinated norm of competition as a Nash equilibrium, in order to
account for why only certain kinds of rent seeking are condemned under
the dormant commerce clause. 82 A Nash equilibrium is a unique solution
or set of available solutions that are stable, in the sense that they maximize
payoffs for each player given the expected strategies of other players in the
absence of formal cooperation. 83 An individual state's effort to enact
regulations, tariffs, or subsidies that are designed to appropriate the gains
of the pro-commerce regime is non-Nash. As Steams argues, a court
striking state legislation under the dormant commerce clause "facilitates a
benign multiple Nash equilibrium game, one that presumptively takes
strategies inducing a mixed-strategy equilibrium outcome off the table, but
that also effectively ratifies the choice of the early movants followed by
other states. 84 The Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence

into any Agreement or Compact with another State ....
").
78. See Maxell L. Steams, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2003).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. McGreal, supra note 60, at 1245-79.
82. Steams, supra note 78.
83.

See ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 23

(2d ed. 1994).
84. Steams, supra note 78, at 12.
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values commonality in market norms between the states over any
individual state's particular regulatory choice.
In effect the Court tells the state whose law is under review that
while the states are free to choose any of two or more available pure
Nash equilibrium outcomes, individual states are not free, after a
common regime is in place, to supplant other states' pure Nash
equilibrium outcome with a mixed-strategy equilibrium, at least
absent a sufficient demonstration that the nonconforming state's
motivation
is other than to disrupt a pure Nash equilibrium
85
strategy.
On this account, the dormant commerce clause responds to an implicit
bargaining failure in the market for inter-jurisdictional regulation. Its
primary concern is with protecting interstate cooperation in lawmaking,
not competition per se. In a world of low bargaining costs, the optimal
level of interstate regulation might be expected to arise, but in actuality
interstate bargaining for regulation is costly and rarely occurs. For
example, it may be costly for a net wine-producing state, like California,
to negotiate ex ante with a net wine-consuming state like New York for
lower regulations or taxes and the low expected gains of such negotiation
may not justify the costs of bargaining. A Coasean bargain for the optimal
level of regulation can fail where there is imperfect information about
preferences or the number of affected jurisdictions is large.8 6 At the same
time, if left to their own internal devices, states may face incentives from
interest groups to pass regulations or taxes that impose spillover costs on
producers or consumers in other jurisdictions. By internalizing spillover
costs, the dormant commerce clause might be understood as restoring the
conditions that make tacit cooperation, or implicit bargains, between states
more likely.
B. Implicationsfor Public Utility Regulation in New Markets
This is an important insight for regulatory law. Unlike the traditional
public choice critique of regulation-which sees judicial intervention in
public law as necessary to condemn rent seeking 87-- the political process

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. On the economic theory of regulation, see Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among
Pressure Groupsfor Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1984); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
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account of the dormant commerce clause targets only those laws that
restrain commerce pursuant to implicit or explicit contracts between other
states. The U.S. Congress and states are allowed to adopt rent-seeking
legislation, in the forms of regulation, subsidies, and taxes. However, an
individual state cannot enact a law that undermines a desirable procommerce regime that has been put into place through the implicit or
explicit cooperation of states, any more than it can undermine a procommerce regime adopted formally by Congress or a federal agency
(under the preemption doctrine).
As an illustration, in the context of deregulated wholesale power
markets, individual states frequently face strong incentives to defect in
order to protect firms in their own internal market, such as local utilities.
Several states have adopted moratoria on exempt wholesale generators
(power plants that are not owned by incumbent utilities but will sell power
in interstate commerce), 88 or have limited the siting of such plants to instate utilities only. 89 Florida's Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted
a state power plant siting statute to limit plant siting to those suppliers who
are Florida utilities or who have contracts with Florida utilities. 90 Perhaps
taking a cue from Florida's success in blocking the development of new
wholesale power plants that do not directly serve in-state customers, other
state and local governments, particularly in the Southern U.S., have
imposed moratoria on merchant plants.9'
States have also attempted to block the siting of merchant interstate
transmission lines, necessary for reliable wholesale power supply markets.
For example, regulatory officials in the state of Connecticut have strongly
opposed the Cross Sound Cable, a 23-mile merchant transmission line that
would allow Long Island Power Authority to import power to Brook
Haven, New York from New Haven, Connecticut, leading to significant
delays in the operation of the transmission line.92 The project was built in

Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).

88. See supra note 42 (referencing state and local government moratoria).
89. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site; Site Without Vision,
ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 23; Pierce, Environmental Regulation,supra note 5.
90. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (holding that state's power plant
siting statute "was not intended to authorize the determination of need for a proposed power plant
output that is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who purchase electrical power at retail
rates").
91. Chris Deisinger, The Backlash Against Merchant Plants and the Need for a New Regulatory
Model, 13 ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 2000, at 51; Nervous of NOx, Southern Govs. Put Plants on Hold,
ELECTRICITY DAILY, Aug. 28, 2001; State Limits on Merchant Plants a Growing Worry, GENERATION
WKLY., Aug. 22, 2001.

92. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:521

2002, following the FERC's approval of retail sales at negotiated
transmission rates,9 3 as well as permit approvals by the Army Corp of
Engineers, the New York Public Service Commission, the Connecticut
Siting Council, and the Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection. 94 It complied with all state siting and environmental statutes,
except for a provision of its state-issued permit which required its lines to
be buried at a certain depth. Expansion of transmission access to locations
such as New York City would provide important capacity, and may have
helped in absorbing some of the transmission shortages that exacerbated
the Summer 2003 blackout. 95 In burying the transmission line, the project
sponsor discovered hard sediments and bedrock protrusions along portions
of the route. Some Connecticut officials cited environmental concerns in
support of their opposition to the project, such as impacts on shellfish beds
and dredging operations into the New Haven Harbor. The transmission
line was built, however, and according to the project's CEO the line was
"buried to the permit depth along 98 percent of the entire span, and over
90% of the route within the Federal Channel to an average of 50.7 feet
below mean lower low water, well below the required level of minus 48
96

feet."9

Nevertheless, a Connecticut official's vocal opposition kept the
transmission line from becoming operational until 2004.97 This may be a
well-intended dispute over environmental regulation, but the line was not
opposed only by environmental interests in the state of Connecticut. As
often is the case when a regulatory body blocks a new entrant into a state's
power industry, there is also an anti-competitive angle to opposition to the
Cross Sound line. Northeast Utilities, a major investor-owned utility
whose customers reside primarily in Connecticut (and which also services
customers in Massachusetts and New Hampshire), owns an older,
competing transmission line (the 1385 cable) that runs parallel to the Cross
Sound Cable, and supports expanding that facility over the new

93. TransEnergie U.S., Ltd., 91 FERC 61,230 (2000).
94. See Regional Energy Reliability and Security: DOE Authority to Energize the Cross Sound
Cable: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 55-56 (2004) (statement of Jeffrey A. Donahue, Chairman and CEO Cross
Sound Cable Company, LLC) [hereinafter Donahue statement].
95. The technical advantage to operating two transmission lines between Connecticut and Long
Island, as opposed to one, is that this would allow electric power to travel in a semi-circular loop--in
and out of Long Island, depending on load.
96. Donahue statement, supra note 94, at 56.
97. Bruce W. Radford, Cross-Sound Cable Puts Feds on the Spot, FORTNIGHTLY'S SPARK, June
2004, at 1, availableat http://www.pur.com/pubs/spark/jun04.pdf.
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transmission line. 98 Northeast Utilities favored updating its line over
approving the Cross Sound line, with which it would compete, and has
requested FERC to use its authority under Section 210 of the FPA to order
New York to assist in replacing the 1385 cable. 99
After the Cross Sound transmission line was built, Connecticut passed
a moratorium on the siting of new or expanded transmission lines across
Long Island Sound,100 effectively limiting the ability of the project's
sponsors to make the project comply with Connecticut's understanding of
the permits. 10 1 The Cross Sound Cable was authorized to operate under an
emergency order issued by the U.S. Secretary of Energy following the
August 2003 blackout, but that order was lifted in early 2004, leaving the
Cross Sound line without permission to go live. 0 2 So, effectively, the
Cross Sound Cable was completed in 2002, but remained dormant as a
permanent transmission alternative until Summer 2004, due to a regulatory
impasse between the state of Connecticut, on the one hand, and the Cross
Sound project's investors and the state of New York, on the other. As
FERC Chairman Pat Wood indicated before Congress in May 2004,
federal regulators lack authority to resolve the issue, given state and local
jurisdiction over transmission-line siting. 10 3 FERC has embraced
wholesale deregulation, but FERC has lacked the authority to preempt the
10 4
state environmental siting process over the transmission line.
Connecticut's Attorney General, backed by environmental interest groups
and Northeast Utilities, threatened litigation if the Cross Sound line is
allowed to go live again, instead favoring expansion of the existing
transmission line, owned by Northeast Utilities.'0 5 Only when FERC
threatened to approve expansion of the 1385 cable was FERC able to force
the parties to the bargaining table.' 0 6 FERC could not preempt the states
and mandate operation of the Cross Sound transmission line, but the threat

98. Id. at 11.
99. Donahue statement, supra note 94, at 56.
100. Moratorium on Grid Projects,supra note 42.
101. Id.
102. Under Section 202(c) of the FPA, the U.S. Secretary of Energy can mandate operation of a
transmission line over objections of state regulators, but only in the context of an emergency-not
where it is merely found to be in the public interest. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2005).
103. Regional Energy Reliability and Security: DOE Authority to Energize the Cross Sound
Cable: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 40-42 (2004) (statement of Patrick Wood, III, Chairman FERC).
104. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress extended to FERC "back stop" authority to
preempt state transmission line siting procedures in limited circumstances.
105. Radford, supra note 97, at 1.
106. PartiesSet Deal to Energize CrossSound Cable, INSIDE F.E.R.C., June 28, 2004, at 1.
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of it making a decision elsewhere 07
led stakeholders to negotiate a
settlement, allowing the line to operate.
As in the context of the Connecticut transmission line dispute, to the
extent that transmission remains entirely within the control of state, rather
than federal, regulators, states may have strong incentives to protect their
own incumbent firms or citizens, rather than supporting cooperative
efforts to expand transmission. Indeed, Suffolk County, New York sued
the state of Connecticut, claiming that its moratorium and other efforts to
block the new transmission line violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 0 8 A political process account of the dormant commerce
clause would suggest that judicial deference to Connecticut's claim of
state environmental benefits is inappropriate. In a dormant commerce
clause challenge to the Connecticut siting dispute, federal courts would
need to carefully scrutinize the claims of environmental protection. Given
that the project was already built, concerns with allowing the line to
become operational seem highly suspect. By defecting from the norm of
interstate cooperation in supporting the growth of transmission
infrastructure to serve the national market, Connecticut was disrupting the
cooperative equilibrium that exists among states (here a cooperative
equilibrium that supports increased competition).
To be sure, some rent transfers are permissible, if not desirable, in the
state political process. For example, rent-seeking in the form of a neutral
corporate tax exemption for utilities, or rent-seeking in the setting of
utility rates to favor industrial growth, is likely permissible, and subject
only to the safeguards of the state political process. However, rent-seeking
in the form of exclusionary regulation that limits access to the interstate
market is more suspect as an economic matter where market exchange is
the cooperative background norm. Florida's Supreme Court rejected a
dormant commerce clause challenge to the use of the state's restrictive
power plant siting statute to restrict the building of new plants by out-ofstate suppliers. 10 9 However, since the dormant commerce clause challenge
was only litigated before the Florida Supreme Court, 1 ° the inadequacy of

107. Bruce Lambert, New York and Connecticut Agree to End Cable Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 2004, at B6. interestingly, the most vocal opponent of the transmission line, Connecticut Attorney
General Richard Blumenthal, was excluded from the negotiations. Michele Jacklin, Editorial, They
Can Bury the Cable, but Not the Controversy, HARTFORD COURANT, July 7, 2004, at A9.
108. See N.Y. County Sues Connecticut, Says Blocking Merchant Line Violates Commerce Clause,
POWER MARKETS WK., May 31, 2004, at 23. Given that, in Summer 2004, a settlement allowed the
line to go operational, this suit was withdrawn.
109. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428,436 (Fla. 2000).
110. Below, the Florida Public Service Commission allowed siting of the power plant, and in
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a state court record establishing discrimination against out-of-state
suppliers probably made this argument less compelling than it could have
been. At a minimum, dormant commerce clause jurisprudence would
require states to explain how legislation restricting power supply in the
wholesale market or transmission expansion might serve benign purposes
of environmental or consumer protection.
It is more difficult to assess the constitutional status of state- or localfranchised monopolies under the dormant commerce clause. On the
political process account, the Town of Clarkstown, New York violated the
dormant commerce clause by granting a monopoly that imposed a veiled
tax on users of waste disposal outside of the locally-sponsored facility,
including outside the state. 1' Its monopoly franchise was invalidated. In
Carbone, Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Blackmun, arguing that the majority had ignored the
distinction between private and public enterprise and that the flow control
ordinance monopoly is easily distinguished from the "entrepreneurial
favoritism [the Court has] previously defined and condemned as
protectionist."' " 2 On the traditional account of judicial intervention, it is
unclear what distinguishes this monopoly from a constitutionally
permissible state or local monopoly.
A political process bargaining account of judicial intervention under
the dormant commerce clause would suggest why electric, natural gas, and
telecommunications monopolies will not necessarily fail constitutional
evaluation if they refuse to open their service territories and network
facilities to competitors. The historical lack of a background norm of
competition excuses many historical monopolies from the constitutional
reach of the dormant commerce clause: If there is no interstate market, a
state or locally imposed monopoly cannot discriminate against out-of-state
commerce. With the development of interstate markets in
telecommunications and electric power, however, more difficult questions
emerge. For example, it might be unconstitutional for a utility to impose a
surcharge on all users of distribution service, regardless of whether they
purchase their power from local or out-of-state suppliers.

doing so made no specific findings of discrimination in violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 43132.
111. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
112. C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 416 (Souter, J., dissenting). According
to Justice Souter's dissent, "[t]he Commerce Clause was not passed to save the citizens of Clarkstown
from themselves." Id. at 430. Thus, the dissent rejects extending the political process account beyond
scenarios that discriminate between local and out-of-town participants.
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If a municipality, such as the Town of Clarkstown, operates a
government-owned monopoly over telecommunications or electric
distribution service, the market-participant exception shields its conduct
from the reach of the dormant commerce clause. 113 Franchised private
utilities-such as investor-owned utilities-pose a potential problem but
are not necessarily unconstitutional, even under the political process
account of the dormant commerce clause. The political process account,
however, warns state and local governments to approach the financing of
such operations with care. In Carbone,the Town of Clarkstown promised
to make up losses from operating the transfer facility at competitive rates,
presumably by taking these losses out of its general revenues. 114 What the
dormant commerce clause seems to prohibit is a local government
explicitly indemnifying a private monopoly out of the public fisc, even
where it imposes the same monopoly and fees on both in- and out-of-state
providers of service. The Takings Clause does not require governments to
take on such obligations,1 15 but the dormant commerce clause may prohibit
them if they are the result of rent seeking that imposes burdens on
interstate cooperation regarding the optimal level of regulation." 6 Further,
as in Carbone, authorizing above-market fees solely for purposes of
maintaining the monopoly may be constitutionally suspect. As we move
from local to state monopoly franchises, concerns with a single firm
capturing the political process are weaker-a single firm that dominates
municipal politics may have little power in state-wide regulatory and
political processes-so state-franchised monopolies may be more likely to
pass constitutional muster. But even neutral financing arrangements may
be suspect if they favor local enterprise and have the "practical effect and
impeding the evolution of cooperative interstate
design"117 of
18
lawmaking.'
If, however, one state approves retail competition while adjacent states
do not, the political process bargaining account does not advise judicial
intervention. While a handful of states may "defect" from interstate
cooperation by embracing competitive mechanisms (such as "retail
wheeling"), 1 9 this is not the type of uncooperative state lawmaking that

113. See sources cited supra note 57.
114. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
115. Instead, the Takings Clause serves to prohibit governmental overreaching.
116. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (summarizing the argument based on
interstate cooperation).
117. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394.
118. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 43.
119. See Kelly A. Karn, Note, State Electric Restructuring:Are Retail Wheeling and Reciprocity
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requires judicial intervention to protect against spillover effects for nonparticipants. Powerful incumbent in-state monopolies could be expected to
oppose such measures in the state political process, so nothing would be
gained by judicial intervention to safeguard against such laws.
II. JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING AND STATE-ACTION IMMUNITY FROM
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

While the dormant commerce clause is an affirmative restriction on
state power to act derived from the Constitution, state-action immunity
serves as a defense from antitrust enforcement. State-action immunity
suspends federal antitrust enforcement under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts 12°-statutes designed to enhance competition and free trade normswhere a state actively supervises the private activity. 12 1 This judiciallycreated antitrust defense originated when the Supreme Court rejected a
Sherman Act challenge to a California marketing program brought by a
grower because the program "derived its authority and its efficacy from
the legislative command of the state., 122 By serving as a "filter" (or
"gatekeeper") for judicial scrutiny of private conduct, 123 such immunity
serves the federalism purpose of facilitating participation in the state
24
regulatory
regulation. 125process1 which lends legitimacy to the development of

Provisions Constitutional?, 33 IND. L. REV. 631 (2000) (arguing that state laws that allow retail
wheeling with out-of-state suppliers only on conditions of reciprocity would fail to withstand dormant
commerce clause scrutiny).
120. See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466
U.S. 558 (1984); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
121. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)
(refusing to grant state action immunity where the program at issue was not actively supervised by the
state).
122. Parker,317 U.S. at 350.
123. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
124. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing PoliticalParticipationand Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997).
125. State-action immunity also may serve a judicial-avoidance purpose, providing federal courts
a way of disposing of complex and technical issues, especially in ways that have a binding impact on
state law. However, other legal doctrines, such as abstention (which advises federal courts to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction out of comity) adequately avoid the precedent-creating risk of federal
court review of state regulation. Abstention can be invoked where a federal court is making a decision
that has a binding effect on state law. By contrast, with antitrust litigation courts are not normally
passing judgments on the lawfulness of state regulation, but are focused on the merits of private
conduct under federal law.
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The impact of a court making a decision not to apply state-action
immunity is not to invalidate a state or local regulation, but to subject
private conduct that complies with (or is envisioned by) regulation to
antitrust scrutiny. Thus, courts evaluating state or local regulation in the
context of state-action immunity should be expected to be less, not more,
deferential to decentralized politics. In addition, to the extent a finding of
state-action immunity provides private firms engaging in certain types of
conduct an absolute defense from antitrust liability, it encourages the
formation of state monopolies, or monopolistic conduct, where states
intend to take private conduct outside of the pale of antitrust enforcement.
Given this, state-action immunity presents a particularly compelling case
for careful judicial scrutiny of state and local regulation. However, courts
are almost oblivious to such concerns and frequently embrace
overbroad
126
judicial deference in the state-action-immunity context.
A. Midcal and Other Smoke Signalsfrom the Supreme Court
In applying state-action immunity, the Supreme Court has adopted a
two-part test to determine which state regulation is exempt from antitrust
enforcement: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy
must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself." 127 This test seems simple
enough. Only if a state law expressly envisions monopolistic conduct and
if the state actively supervises such conduct, will the conduct escape
antitrust enforcement. In application, though, courts have struggled in
applying state-action immunity, often because different bodies within a
state take on the regulatory role and because the nature of regulation varies
so much from industry to industry. While state-action immunity might be
intended to create a safe harbor for state and local politics, judicial
decisions invoking it are hardly consistent or principled. The Supreme
Court's current approach to state-action immunity also seems to ignore
how judicial deference in this context can create incentives in the state and
local lawmaking process that are harmful to social welfare.
Application of state-action immunity to local governments, such as
municipal bodies, as opposed to states, has presented a difficult challenge
for courts. 28 Local government lawmaking perhaps provides the most

126. See FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 14.
127. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (citation
omitted).
128. Commentary on the applicability of state action immunity to local governments is abundant.
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salient opportunity for extension of the political process insights of
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence to the state-action-immunity
context in antitrust law. In a short-lived line of cases, the Supreme Court
read state-action immunity narrowly in the context of municipal (as
opposed to state) regulation. Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, Colorado,1 29 for example, subjected municipal governments to
antitrust enforcement for monopolistic conduct. Speaking for the majority,
Justice Brennan distinguished between states regulating as states-entitled
to the state action defense under a federalism rationale-and as political
subdivisions-exempt from antitrust enforcement only insofar as they are
implementing state policy, but not when they are acting as municipal
governments only. 130 The City of Boulder's moratorium on cable
television expansion was thus subject to antitrust challenge because
Colorado, at the state level, had not clearly expressed a policy to regulate
cable television; in fact, Justice Brennan thought it apparent that Colorado
had no state-wide policy at all-that there was a gap in state regulation.13'
This rationale for narrowing the availability of the state action defense
for municipal governments is striking in its similarity to the political
process account of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Like the
constitutionally suspect municipally franchised monopoly in Carbone,
which the Court believed to impair external market competition, the City
of Boulder's moratorium on cable effectuates a tax on its citizens that goes
too far. This impairs competition in the internal (intrastate) market, as well
as perhaps in the external (interstate) market. As such, a certain
convergence between the dormant commerce clause and state-action
immunity informs the Court's skepticism about local regulation in this line
of cases. To the extent that both the dormant commerce clause and stateaction immunity emphasize the incentives private firms face in bargaining
in the law-making process with state and local governments, a narrow

See, e.g., John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61
TEX. L. REV. 481 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. &

ECON. 23 (1983); Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v. Berkeley, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1257 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and
FederalAntitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1985); John E. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal
Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.23 (1984); Glen 0. Robinson, The
Sherman Act as a Home Rule Charter: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 2
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 131 (1983); C. Paul Rogers III, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a Federalist
System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305.
129. Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
130. Id. at 52-56.
131. Id. at 54-55. Justice Brennan was clear that "mere neutrality" by the state regarding
municipal regulation does not suffice. Instead, a "clear articulation and affirmative expression" to
replace antitrust enforcement with regulation is necessary. Id. at 55.
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reading of state-action immunity from antitrust enforcement against
private firms is justified in the municipal context for the very same reasons
that the political process account of the dormant commerce clause makes
sense. 132
A more recent line of cases, however, departs from the municipal-state
distinction in antitrust immunity that Justice Brennan laid down in the
context of cable television regulation.1 33 In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire,134 the Court abandoned the clear-articulation requirement in
assessing municipal state-action immunity. Instead, Justice Powell
reasoned in his majority opinion, as long as a state confers permissive
authority in general terms for a municipality to deal with a matter within
the municipal government's discretion, this is sufficient to exclude the
conduct from antitrust enforcement.1 35 Thus, when the state of Wisconsin
granted municipalities the authority to establish sewage treatment plants,
this impliedly granted municipal government the power to make decisions
about who would be served. Justice Powell recognized that municipalities
may exercise "purely parochial public interests" which, at some level,
could be subject to antitrust enforcement.' 36 In his view, however, a state
delegation to a municipal government is sufficient to meet the clearly
expressed and fully articulated criterion of the state-action immunity test,
which reading exempts from antitrust enforcement a large range of
municipal regulation. 137 Under this approach, an "express mention" by a
legislature of an intent to displace competition is not necessary (although
perhaps it would be sufficient); instead, the Court suggests, what matters is
that the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct is a "foreseeable result" of the
38
state policy.
In addition, at least in the original Midcal formulation, state-action
immunity requires courts to determine how active and involved a
regulatory scheme must be for purposes of deeming it "active

132. Reacting to the prospect of liability created by City of Boulder, Congress abolished money
damage liability under the antitrust laws for municipalities, their officials, and private persons acting
under the direction of local governments and their officials in the Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984. See H.R. REP. No. 98-965, at 18-19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4619-20.
Congress continued, however, to authorize antitrust liability for private conduct that is sanctioned or
authorized by municipal governments.
133. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
134. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
135. Id.at 46.
136. Id. at 47.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 41-42.
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supervision. 13 9 In Hallie, however, the Supreme Court effectively
abandoned the requirement of active state supervision, at least insofar as it
applies to municipalities. 140 In so holding, the Court explained that the
purpose of state supervision is to ensure that regulatory policies are
pursued for public purposes and not to enrich private actors. According to
the Court, "Where a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive
activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests,
rather than the governmental interests of the State."' 14 1 But, if a state has
clearly authorized a municipality to act, the Court reasoned that there is no
such problem. Instead, the "only real danger is that it will seek to further
purely parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state
goals."' 142 Thus, if it is clear that state authorization exists, either expressly
or by virtue of foreseeable results, the Court held that there is no need to
make a finding that the state 143actively supervises the municipality's
regulation of the private activity.
While this approach envisions an inquiry into the "foreseeable results"
of policy adopted by a state legislative body, it does not define what the
inquiry would entail. 144 Appellate courts following this approach invoke
state-action immunity based almost exclusively on a clear legislative
purpose, or a clear statement to displace competition or antitrust
enforcement by courts. 45 Beyond this, however, they generally engage in
judicial restraint, deferring to state regulation of public utility monopolies
under the antitrust laws. 46 Deference has its appeal in a complex
regulatory environment, but the Court's relaxation of a state supervision
requirement for municipalities is counterintuitive if not incoherent. The
premise that municipal regulation is not likely to be captured by private
interests at the expense of the public good ignores the high risk of interest
group capture at the local level, where the incentives for ex ante lobbying
of the regulator are perhaps strongest. At the local level, the costs to firms
of organizing and lobbying regulators are much lower than at the state

139,
140.
141.
142.

Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980).
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985).
Id. at 47.
Id.

143.

Id.

144. For a discussion of this aspect of Hallie, see Elizabeth Trujillo, The Hidden Prong of the
Midcal Test: A New Look at State Action as the Pendulum Shifts Towards Deregulation of the
ElectricalMarkets, 83 DENV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).

145. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
146. Id. See also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) ("Once it is clear
that state authorization exists, there is no need to require the state to supervise activity the
municipality's execution of what is a properly delegated function.").
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level. 147 Although the Court seems to embrace a federalism-based
formalism as a rationale for deference to municipal regulation, this
account of federalism proves too much. Such a stance can result in state
delegation to municipal governments with no strings attached, insulating
private behavior at the local level from almost all antitrust enforcement.
Further, it places focus on the mere formalistic articulation of state goals
by a state body, without addressing their purpose. States, as well as
municipal governments, sometimes regulate in ways that allow private
interests to place their own economic well-being ahead of the public good.
Allowing the law to insulate such private conduct from antitrust scrutiny
may have serious consequences in deregulated markets.
The Court's state-action immunity cases in the context of municipal
regulation seem to view the clear-articulation and active-supervision
requirements as one and the same, or as collapsing into a one-step
foreseeability test.1 48 In a more recent case on the topic, however, the
Court has made it clear that the active-supervision requirement is alive and
well as an independent criterion where the conduct of state, as opposed to
municipal, regulators is at issue. 149 The Court's decision nonetheless raises
many questions about the scope of application of this test to many private
arrangements in deregulated markets. In FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance
Co., 50 the Court addressed the application of state-action immunity to the
rate-setting activities of title insurance companies in several states. Most
of the states regulating the title insurance defendants permitted private
insurers to jointly file rates, which state officials could reject or allow to
remain in effect.15 1 The record of the case suggested that no significant
review of the rates actually took place by these states.' 5 2 The FTC had
conceded that the state statutes authorizing the acceptance of jointly filed
rates met the clear-articulation requirement, 153 but the Court found the
agency's review did not constitute active supervision and thus failed the

147. One would expect a powerful firm at the local level to hold more influence over elected
officials than at the state level.
148. See Trujillo, supra note 144.
149. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
150. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
151. Id. at629-31.
152. Id. In Wisconsin, for example, no rate hearings had occurred. Id. at 630.
153. Id. at 631. In the decision below, the Third Circuit, following a First Circuit decision, held
that the existence of a funded and authorized state program met the active-supervision requirement.
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 922 F.2d 1122, 1136 (3d Cir. 1991) (following New Eng. Motor Rate
Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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second step of Midcal. 54 Hence, the Court concluded, the allegedly
55
anticompetitive acts of the insurers could be challenged. 1
B. Hazy Signalsfrom Appellate Courts in RestructuredMarkets
Since state-action immunity serves a gatekeeping function for antitrust
enforcement, the defense will increasingly play an important role as
formerly regulated firms are deregulated.156 Yet, according to most
appellate courts, the gates of antitrust enforcement remain closed, allowing
the conduct of many private firms to escape antitrust scrutiny altogether in
emerging competitive markets. Despite Ticor's signal that the active
supervision requirement is alive and well, lower courts-especially the
Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits-generally have continued to take a
deferential approach to state-action immunity in reviewing state regulation
in deregulated markets. Even where state, not local, regulation is at issue
and even where competitive markets for service are emerging, these courts
are not inclined to allow the Sherman Act to apply to private conduct in
formerly regulated industries where there is some state regulatory scheme,
however incomplete it is.
Illustrating this deferential and narrowing approach to judicial
intervention, the Tenth Circuit has embraced particularly broad antitrust
immunity for electric utilities, despite the introduction of competition into
large segments of the industry. For example, the Tenth Circuit extended
antitrust immunity to Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company's (OG&E)
conduct based on evidence that the state regulatory agency had "general
supervision" authority over the utility, "including the power to fix all of
OG&E's rates for electricity and to promulgate all the rules and
57
regulations that affect OG&E's services, operation, and management."'1
The Tenth Circuit deemed a state agency's power to engage in review
alone as sufficient for applying state-action immunity, effectively
rendering the active-supervision requirement meaningless. 5 8 While the
court cited a previous case which "found that the use of similar authority
over an electric utility satisfied the active supervision requirement"' 159 as a

154.
155.

FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992).
Id. at 647.

156. See Jeffery D. Schwartz, Comment, The Use of Antitrust State Action Doctrine in the
DeregulatedElectric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1449 (1999).
157. Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th
Cir. 2001).
158.

Id.

159. Id. (citing Lease Lights, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d 1330, 1334 (10th Cit.
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basis for this conclusion, it made no effort whatsoever to discern evidence
of the affirmative use of such authority
by the regulator with respect to the
160
utility whose conduct was at issue.
The Eighth Circuit has taken a similarly deferential approach to stateaction immunity. 16' North Star Steel, a customer located within the
exclusive service territory of MidAmerican, an electric utility in Iowa,
sought to purchase competitively priced electricity and requested that
MidAmerican wheel power to it. 162 MidAmerican refused, and North Star
sued, alleging that the utility violated the antitrust laws by refusing to
allow access to its transmission lines. 63 The court found that active
supervision of the utility's conduct existed due to the fact that by statute in
Iowa new customers were assigned to exclusive service providers and, in
the event there was a conflict over which provider was in control of a
given area, the regulator determined which provider should "occupy" the
area.164 The court found that Iowa's legislature "affirmatively expressed" 65a
policy of displacing competition in the market for retail electric service.
The court refused, however, to explore the substantive basis for the
agency's regulatory determinations in defining exclusive service
territories.166 For instance, even though the state had experimented with
limited "pilot" retail wheeling programs, 67 the court did not evaluate
whether the state agency's efforts to promote competition in power supply
might coexist with maintaining exclusive service territories over
transmission and distribution, effectively deferring to state regulators on
all of these issues.' 68 In fact, the only regulatory action that was discussed
by the court related to the definition of distribution service territories, not

1988)).
160. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220. The case presents a notable contrast to a later Tenth
Circuit case, in which the court refused to extend state action immunity to unilateral activity which
was "neither mandated, nor authorized, nor reviewed, nor even known about" by the state regulator.
Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140 (10th Cir. 2002).
This case is also too narrow in its construction of state action immunity. As is discussed infra, state
action immunity should not be limited to purely "unilateral" activity, but should also extend to
bilateral activity in which the regulator plays a passive role.
161. N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 1999).
162. Id. at 734.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 738-39.
165. Id. at 738. Given a previous ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit assumed
for collateral estoppel purposes that "under Iowa law the exclusive service territory provisions include
the generation of electricity for retail sales." Id. at 737-38.
166. The court did not, for example, review how service territories were determined.
167. N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 1999).
168. Id.
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the allocation of power supply or generation. 69 The court also reasoned
that "less pervasive regulatory
regimes have been held to satisfy the active
70
supervision prong."
One of these "less pervasive" regulatory regimes is blanket state
prohibitions-by statute or regulation-on certain types of procompetitive conduct.' 7' For example, according to Florida's regulators and
courts, Florida has adopted a statutory prohibition on retail electric
competition, outside of self-wheeling arrangements (i.e., a supplier72
transmitting power over the utility's lines for the supplier's own use).
Although Florida does not have a clear legislative statement regarding the
issue, Florida's Public Service Commission (PSC) had adopted a
regulation which prohibits retail wheeling to provide access to competitive
power supply outside of self-wheeling arrangements. 73 A Florida
Supreme Court case had previously interpreted this regulation to preclude
cogenerators from selling their power in the retail market. 174 Accepting
both the regulation and the Florida Supreme Court's characterization of
the regulation, the Eleventh Circuit applied state-action immunity to
preclude an antitrust action by a cogeneration facility against a utility
which refused to wheel power at a competitive rate. 175 The court reasoned
' 76
that "the doors to the PSC were open to all with standing to complain,"'
but nowhere did the court identify how a private cogenerator might raise
such issues before the Florida PSC. 17 7 Arguably, it could not, other than by
directly challenging the state agency regulation authorizing the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct.
A way of understanding the antitrust claim before the Eleventh Circuit
is as a collateral attack on the state agency rule based on a substantive
violation of federal antitrust law. The decision echoes a previous Eleventh
Circuit case, in which it was found that state-action immunity protects a
regulated electric utility's division of service territories in the county in
78
which a customer is located from Sherman Act restraint-of-trade claims.
Taken together, these Eleventh Circuit opinions seem to suggest that the

169. Id.
170. Id.at 739.
171. Many states limit competition not through active regulation of the industry but by prohibiting
certain basic market exchanges or sales.
172. PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (1 th Cir. 1996).
176. Id.
at 1570.
177. Id.
178. Praxair, Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609 (11 th Cir. 1995).
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existence of an agency rule authorizing anticompetitive conduct is enough
to trigger active supervision. 7 9 If this holds, however, private conduct can
be insulated from antitrust liability not only by the actions of a state
legislature, but also a unilaterally adopted agency rule, even if this rule
prohibits pro-competitive conduct with little or no agency oversight.
This deferential approach to gatekeeping in antitrust enforcement has
serious implications for the enforcement of the antitrust laws in
deregulated markets. In California's deregulated electric power market,
wholesale power suppliers possessing market power have allegedly
engaged in tacit collusion to withhold supply and to thus artificially inflate
their prices.1 80 Of course, both federal and state regulation continued, even
in the context of California's failed regulation plan.1 81 FERC made its own
determinations that individual firms lacked market power and had
approved several market-based tariffs, allowing deregulation in the
wholesale market. 182 As to California's retail market, state agencies as
well had approved the sale of power by these suppliers through the statesanctioned market exchange. 83 To the extent that the behavior of any
private firms operating in this market raised a plausible Section 1 (or even
a Section 2) antitrust claim under the Sherman Act, the mere existence of a
state-sanctioned and -supervised market should not give rise to state-action
immunity.
These appellate court decisions, however, send mixed signals at best.
At worst, these decisions invite private manipulation of state and local

179. Id. at 613 ("An agency's interpretation of its own regulations must be given controlling
weight unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."). In an earlier
case, the Eleventh Circuit relied entirely on the clear-articulation requirement to find state-action
immunity. See Mun. Utils. Bd. of Albertville v. Ala. Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493 (11 th Cir. 1991). This
seems to completely take state-action immunity outside of the two part Midcal test, turning it into a
one-step clear-articulation requirement. In S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48, 60 (1985), the Court stated: "The federal antitrust laws do not forbid the States to adopt
policies that permit, but do not compel, anticompetitive conduct by regulatedprivate parties. As long
as the State clearly articulates its intent to adopt a permissive policy, the first prong of the Midcal test
is satisfied." The Court made it clear that the presence or absence of compulsion is not the "sine qua
non to state-action immunity." Id.
180. See Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant)Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation is
to Blame for California's Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power
When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use), 83 OR. L. REV. 207 (2004); Robert B. Martin, Il1,
Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust Enforcement in the California Electricity Crisis, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (2003).
181. California, for instance, retained a complicated system of state regulation.
182.

See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY UPDATE, supra note 40, ch. 7.

183. For discussion of this regulatory framework, see Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation
Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision
of Public Goods, 100 MiCH. L. REV. 1768 (2002) (book review).
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regulators to create antitrust immunity. Particularly as state and local
governments engage in lawmaking in partially deregulated markets, the
risks of private manipulation of lawmaking are high. Given this, courts
could improve the functioning of deregulated markets, as well as the
political process, if they could devise a more principled way of exercising
their gatekeeping function in the state-action immunity context.
III. REASSESSING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN ANTITRUST FEDERALISM
Since Hallie, the Supreme Court has abandoned the political-processinformed municipal-state distinction in assessing state-action immunity
from antitrust enforcement. In place of this, federal courts assume a highly
deferential stance in reviewing both state and local regulation as they
apply state-action immunity to antitrust challenges to allegedly
anticompetitive conduct. If a state regulates an activity, courts reviewing
private conduct under complex regulatory schemes are increasingly likely
to imply a regulatory policy-sometimes even absent a clear articulation
of regulatory purpose by the state. 184 This indicates a strong judicial
preference for deference-and against judicial intervention-in applying
state-action immunity as an antitrust defense.
The active-supervision prong of state-action immunity is also judicially
implied in many recent cases involving deregulated electric power
markets, especially in the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh circuits. 185 These
courts fail to evaluate the degree of scrutiny provided by state or local
regulators, as well as whether the purpose of this supervision overlaps
with the pro-competitive goals of the Sherman Act. 186 Their approach
evinces a serious lapse of judicial gatekeeping in the consideration of
antitrust challenges to private conduct in restructured industries, such as
electric power and telecommunications. Without a judicial safeguard,
overbroad judicial endorsement of state-action immunity allows allegedly
anticompetitive private conduct to escape scrutiny altogether and risks
undermining the goals of competition law, particularly as national markets
in these industries develop.

184. Courts do so by making a determination that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct was either
explicitly envisioned by, or foreseeable to, state legislators. See supra text accompanying notes 13444 (referencing the foreseeability approach).
185. See supra notes 156-83 and accompanying text.
186.

Id.
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A. Deference, Incentives, and Spillover Costs in State-Action Immunity
Merrick Garland, now a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, has been one of the strongest defenders of this
deferential approach to state-action immunity in considering the relevance
of state regulation.1 87 In a leading article on state-action immunity, he
argues that there is no principled basis for distinguishing between
municipalities and states for federal antitrust law purposes. 188 Put simply,
his view is that state and local legislation should not be assessed by the
federal89courts for either their efficiency or rent-seeking effects in antitrust
cases. 1

Several scholars depart from this strong deference approach to stateaction immunity by proposing efficiency criteria for courts to use in
evaluating state regulation in antitrust federalism. Responding to Hallie,
John Shepard Wiley proposes that courts directly address the efficiency,
and in particular public choice, implications of state and local legislation
in deciding whether to invoke state-action immunity.1 90 According to
Wiley, if anticompetitive legislation is inefficient and the result of
producer-interest lobbying, state-action immunity should not shield
conduct authorized under the legislation from scrutiny under the Sherman
Act.191 In similar spirit, Matthew Spitzer argues that federal courts should
intervene in evaluating antitrust claims notwithstanding state or local
legislation if the legislation is inefficient or transfers wealth from
consumers to producers. 92 John Cirace argues that courts should employ
an efficiency test to evaluate the effects of state and local legislation on
claims under the Sherman Act. 193 Others, such as Steven Semeraro, find
the efficiency and public choice focus of these scholars incomplete, but
this does not lead him to recommend strong deference; instead, Semeraro
argues for rigorous94review of state and local regulation on public-interestoriented grounds. 1

187. See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action. Economic Efficiency and the Political
Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987).
188. Id. at 502-07.
189. Id. at 519.
190. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713.
(1986).
191. Id. at 788-89.
192. Matthew Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice PoliticalEconomy: A Critique of
Capture Theory, 61 S.CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1988).
193. Cirace, supra note 128.
194. Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
203, 212-13 (2000) (arguing that, based on a "status choice" approach, courts should inquire "whether
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In contrast, defenders of judicial deference in antitrust federalism see
judicial review of state and local laws for efficiency, rent-seeking, or
public interest goals as tantamount to federal courts returning to
substantive due process review of state and local regulation, which
encroaches on decentralized lawmaking in the economic regulation
context. 195 Like advocates of deregulatory takings in public utility law
attempt to reinvigorate Lochner v. New York' 96 in determining government
liability for regulatory transitions, 197 strong deference advocates are
concerned that judicial intervention in the context of state-action immunity
98
will necessarily lead courts to a Lochner-type review of regulation.
Garland, for example, favors exempting from judicial review under the
Sherman Act all regulatory actions by state and local governments except
for delegations to private parties of the power to restrain the market to
private parties.1 99
However, it has been a hundred years since Lochner was decided and
more than sixty years since it reigned supreme in utility law, 200 and no one
seriously wishes to invoke its ghost.20 ' Indeed, if judicial review of
decentralized lawmaking is approached in a principled and cautious
manner, a deferential stance to antitrust immunity certainly is not
necessary to limit the scope of judicial review. As Daniel Gifford has
argued, federal courts have the capacity to review state and local
legislation without directly addressing their substantive efficiency
effects.20 2 Gifford suggests that courts apply the same "free market"
approach in the state-action-immunity context that they apply under the
dormant commerce clause by recognizing two markets. 20 3 State-action

a government actor's conception of the public interest is being furthered by the anticompetitive
restraint").
195. See Garland, supra note 187.
196. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
197. See J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE

UNITED STATES (1997). For criticism, see Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1535 (1999) (book review); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident
Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801 (1999) (book review); Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note
68, at 1460-63; Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297 (1998) (book
review).
198. Garland, supra note 187, at 488 (making an explicit comparison to Lochner).
199. Id. at 506.
200. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (abandoning
substantive review of utility rates).
201. See Chen, supra note 197, at 1568.
202. Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism,Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why
We Should Followa Consistent Free-MarketPolicy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227 (1995).
203. Id.
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immunity would protect the internal (intra-state) market from trade
restraints, while the dormant commerce clause extends to the external
(inter-state) market.2 °4
Gifford's "two markets" approach has some appeal, but the bargaining
process account 20 5 illustrates that judicial review in both constitutional law
and antitrust federalism contexts could entail something more than judicial
endorsement of free markets at differing vertical levels. Put simply, a
private markets theme, focused exclusively on market failure, has too
much horsepower to serve as a useful test for courts in reviewing state and
local regulation. Of course, both federal and state-local regulators can
make choices to regulate in the public interest, or even to take ownership
of a firm's resources. 22006 Thus, neither doctrine really requires private
competitive markets at either the federal or state level.
In contrast, a political process bargaining account illustrates how both
doctrines are primarily concerned with failures in cooperation, rather than
market competition. So understood, state-action immunity from antitrust
enforcement serves purposes similar to those the political process account
of the dormant commerce clause embraces. Apart from Gifford, courts and
commentators have only explicitly recognized the connection between the
two doctrines on rare occasions,20 7 let alone considered whether both
doctrines share political process concerns.
Although they do not discuss the similarities between the doctrines,
Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld have perhaps made the most strident
political-process-based argument in the antitrust federalism context,
arguing that state-action immunity should only be invoked where
20 8
regulation imposes substantial spillover costs on out-of-state interests.
On their view, state-action immunity would not remove from antitrust
enforcement all private monopolies, but only those which are actively
supervised by the state for purposes of limiting the harms that flow from
unregulated monopoly. 20 9 The active-supervision prong of state-action
immunity is not inherently anti-commerce, but recognizes the necessity for
regulation to correct for certain market failures where the public interest
demands it. On this understanding, for state-action immunity to make

204. Id.
205. See supra Part I.A.
206. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing the ICC and TVA).
207. One of those rare occasions is a classic case that created state action immunity. Parker v.
Brown raised both dormant commerce clause and antitrust challenges to the California raisin
marketing program. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
208. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 124.
209. Id.
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sense in its application, enforcement of pro-commerce norms is necessary
where the federalism-based value of participation comes into conflict with
efficiency, as may occur if state regulation creates spillover costs for those
who do not participate in the relevant regulatory process. In this respect,
the process bargaining account of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
also might inform the judicial approach to state-action immunity.
To the extent that this account is correct, courts must set a relatively
high threshold before invoking gatekeeping presumptions, as they do in
determining when state-action immunity precludes antitrust enforcement.
However, recent cases involving utility restructuring illustrate the problem
of the low state-action-immunity threshold many lower courts currently
embrace. 210 Especially in a process of restructuring or deregulationwhich gives birth to the norms of competition-private firms face strong
incentives to use the regulatory process to enact partial regulatory schemes
for purposes of establishing immunity from the antitrust laws. As states
have begun to deregulate industries such as telecommunications and
electric power, the nature of state regulation has changed. Rather than
regulating utilities through rate and traditional certificate-of-need
proceedings,21' increasingly regulators are laying down general structural
rules or approving structural, rather than pricing, tariffs.21 2 Most agree
that, with the rise of competitive markets, antitrust law plays a more-not
less-important role than under traditional rate regulation. 21 3 As one
Department of Justice lawyer has recognized in the context of antitrust
enforcement in emerging competitive electric power markets, "If a state
opens its retail market to competition, then the state action doctrine would
not apply to conduct that relates directly to retail competition. 21 4 The

210. See supra Part II.B.
211. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
212. Order 888 is an example. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY UPDATE, supra note 40, ch. 8.
213. See Dibadj, supra note 13. See also Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust Law Regulation: A New
Focus for a Competitive Energy Industry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79 (2000); Jade Alice Eaton, Recent United
States Department of Justice Actions in the Electric Utility Industry, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 857 (1994);
Craig A. Glazer & M. Bryan Little, The Roles of Antitrust Law and Regulatory Oversight in the
Restructured Electricity Industry, 12 ELECTRICITY J. 21 (May 1999); William J. Kolasky, Network
Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 577 (1999); John Burrit McArthur, Anti-trust in
the New [De]Regulated Natural Gas Industry, 18 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1997); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A
ProposedAntitrust Analysis of Telecommunications Joint Ventures, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 639; William
Baer, FTC Perspectives on Competition Policy and Enforcement Initiativesin ElectricPower, Address
Before the Conference on the New Rules of the Game for Electric Power: Antitrust and
Anticompetitive Behavior (Dec. 4, 1997), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/elecl204.htm; Robert
Pitofsky, Competition Policy in Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches, Address
Before the Glasser LegalWorks Seminar on Competitive Policy in Communications Industries: New
Antitrust Approaches (Mar. 10, 1997), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/newcomm.htm.
214. Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., State Action Doctrine Losing Relevance, Department of Justice
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reality of separating regulated from unregulated conduct for antitrust
federalism purposes is hardly simple, however, as states frequently
endorse competition in some, but not all, aspects of formerly regulated
industries, such as electric power and telecommunications. 1 5
A political process bargaining framework is consistent with the overall
goal of protecting markets, in both the internal and external contexts, but
advises a different emphasis for state-action immunity than previous
efforts, such as Gifford's, which allow consistency with free market
principles to drive both dormant commerce clause jurisprudence and stateaction immunity.2 16 Understanding state and local legislation as based in
bargaining focuses on the process that leads to lawmaking, rather than on
unregulated markets themselves. Between states, bargaining frequently
fails, and may be costly to achieve, given the Compact Clause. 2 7 The
dormant commerce clause serves as a safeguard to this concern.
Within a state, as in other lawmaking processes, private interest groups
frequently face incentives to lobby lawmakers to secure benefits, and may
prefer open-ended regulatory schemes which leave details to be worked
out by an agency firm-by-firm. The more local the lawmaking process, the
less costly it is for powerful interest groups to organize and influence the
process, but lawmaking can have serious spillover effects for nonparticipants. At the local level, capture may be more visible, but it also
may be more stable, given ability to capture the political as well as the
regulatory process. Thus, if courts are to focus on the quality of the
political process leading to enactment of a market restraint, the nowdefunct municipal-state distinction is sensible. It would require courts to
apply more scrutiny to local, as opposed to state, regulations in restraint of
trade. Instead of protecting markets per se, state-action immunity (like the
dormant commerce clause) can be understood as representationreinforcing. The main difference is that, in the Sherman Act context,
Congress has already declared an overriding purpose of competition, so

Attorney Says, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, May 15, 1999, at 70 (quoting Milton A. Marquis, attorney
with U.S. Department of Justice antitrust division).
215. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY UPDATE, supranote 40, ch. 8.
216. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. Others draw on this approach, but do not
fully develop its implications for network and other regulated industries. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra
note 128 (focusing on interstate market effects of regulation); Levmore, supra note 38, at 626-29
(arguing state action immunity should be reformulated to focus on the effects of regulation in interstate
markets).
217. Seesupra note 77.
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the primary source of the competitive norm is legislative, not based on an
implicit norm of cooperation between the states.2 18
This account also has implications for the judicial approach in applying
state-action immunity to lawmaking at the state level, as courts frequently
are asked to do in deregulated electric power and telecommunications
markets. As Frank Easterbook has suggested, legal presumptions can play
an important role in antitrust law, particularly where they serve as
gatekeeping filters for judicial consideration of antitrust claims.2 19 If stateaction-immunity doctrine is approached as providing default rules to guide
judicial intervention, such presumptions could set positive incentives in
the bargaining process of state lawmaking.
First, as to the clear-articulation requirement, courts could clarify that
this is a type of a clear-statement rule designed to promote more
democratic decisionmaking at the state level. State-action immunity,
implied from the Sherman Act, affords immunity for purposes of
promoting federalism-valued because of the democratic legitimacy it
affords, not because state decisions in and of themselves are sacrosanct.
220
Clear-statement rules skew decisionmaking toward the political process.
If the state legislature adopts a clear statement, or expressly articulates
policy to regulate in restraint of trade, courts may decline to interfere
under the first prong of the Midcal test. As William Page has argued in
some of the leading articles on state-action immunity, such a clear
statement heightens the visibility of legislation, encouraging participants
in the political process to acquire information about and to debate
policies. 22 1 Absent such a statement, private conduct that is consistent with
or authorized by broad delegations to municipal governments or regulatory
agencies would be subject to review under the Sherman Act.
Dillon's Rule, a canon that only broadly applied in states to invalidate
broad state delegations to municipalities (most states have moved away
from this with the growth of "home rule"), may serve the same overall
goal of providing a higher level of supervision for municipal
lawmaking.22 2 The effect of the clear-articulation requirement, however, is

218.

See supra note 19.

219. Easterbrook, supranote 123.
220. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement
Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
221. William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and
Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099 (1981);
William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic
Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618.

222. See Gillette, supra note 6.
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not to create a federally-enforced version of Dillon's Rule. Dillon's Rule
invalidates delegations to municipalities absent express approval by the
state legislature. 223 In contrast to Dillon's Rule, which automatically
invalidates the delegation, the clear-articulation requirement would subject
the delegation to scrutiny under the Sherman Act, but might still allow it
to stand if it did not unlawfully restrain trade or was not otherwise
anticompetitive.
Yet, traditional clear-statement rules have their limits, as they assume
that a legislature itself speaks with a single purpose and voice. As Kenneth
Shepsle and many others before and after him have put it, a legislature is a
"they," not an "it.' ' 224 A clear-statement rule is a hermeneutic effort to get
at legislative intent-to pay fidelity to past preferences, which are a
judicially constructed fiction-but a legislature will rarely have a clear
intent on an issue of complex economic regulation. Courts can readily
abuse clear-statement rules to the extent that judges use judicially-implied
clear statements as a backdoor means to impose a constitutional design"judicial modesty cloaking judicial activism.'2 25 Moreover, a clear
statement rule assumes that the major problem is the legislature, not the
interest groups which interact with lawmaking bodies.
By contrast, a different type of interpretive canon-"preferenceeliciting default rules"-provides a better way of conceptualizing the
clear-articulation requirement in state-action immunity.2 26 Einer Elhauge
has recently argued for a "penalty default rules" in judicial interpretation
of statutes: Where a court interpreting a statute is unsure of Congress's
intent, the court adopts the interpretation of the statute that is most
unfavorable to the interest group which is most capable of persuading
Congress to reverse the interpretation. 7 Much as penalty default rules in
contract law are designed to elicit better information in future
contracting, 228 such a penalty-enhancing approach encourages a different
type of private behavior in future lawmaking processes. Specifically,
Elhauge envisions a preference-eliciting approach as influencing private
behavior to procure more explicit legislative action in the future, which

223. See Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868).
224. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They, " Not an "It ":Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).

225. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 220, at 646.
226. Einer Elhauge, Preference-ElicitingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162
(2002).
227.

Id.
228. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice

of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992).
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will increase the accountability of the political process. 229 The cleararticulation requirement in state-action immunity serves a similar purpose.
Understood as a penalty-enhancing default rule, a clear-articulation
requirement does not give rise to automatic state-action immunity where a
legislature could merely foresee some regulatory activity. Instead, a
penalty-default clear-statement rule would assign ambiguity a result that
the interest groups most likely to reverse the interpretation (i.e., those with
monopoly power in an industry) would disfavor-here, antitrust
enforcement. Interest groups may be successful in persuading state
lawmakers to adopt an antitrust exemption for industries, but lawmakers
should be required to use clear and unmistakable language in supplanting
antitrust laws with delegations to local governments or regulatory
agencies.
A preference-eliciting penalty-default rule is only a partial solution to
the problem created by regulatory incompleteness in state lawmaking. A
clear articulation of purpose is necessary, and does a lot of the heavy
lifting in state-action-immunity analysis, but it is not a sufficient basis for
suspending judicial review of market conduct under the Sherman Act.
Some evaluation of how the state engaged in regulatory oversight is also
necessary to guard against private abuse of a regulatory gap. The activesupervision prong of Midcal provides this, and as Ticor would suggest, it
is incumbent on federal courts to take this prong seriously.
The Ninth Circuit has recognized the importance of active supervision
in restructured network industries by applying Midcal in a way that
contrasts markedly with the approaches of the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh
circuits. Columbia Steel Casting,Inc. v. Portland General Electric Co.,230
a leading Ninth Circuit case on the topic, embraces a skeptical stance to a
state-action-immunity claim in a partially deregulated electric power
market. There, the state of Oregon had clearly expressed a legislative
policy to remove market competition by authorizing regulators to approve
allocations of service territories 2 3 ' However, Midcal and Ticor suggest
that, in considering antitrust claims, judicial gatekeepers examine not only
the legislature's clarity in delegating to the regulator, but also what the
regulator does in exercising its discretion. 2 Recognizing this, the Ninth
Circuit properly refused to extend state-action immunity to a utility's
purported anticompetitive conduct in dividing Portland into exclusive

229.
230.
231.
232.

Elhauge, supranote 226.
II F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1433 n.2.
See supra notes 127, 150-55 and accompanying text.
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service territories, given that regulators had not made firm-specific
decisions to displace competition with regulation.2 33 Although the utility
claimed that its conduct was consistent with previous contracts and orders
agreed to under generally delegated ratemaking authority, the only way the
regulator could have mandated service territories was pursuant to a statute
under which the regulator had not acted. 234 "[M]ere 'state authorization,
approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct
confers no antitrust immunity,,, 235 the Ninth Circuit explained.
If a clear articulation of purpose alone were sufficient to provide a
shield from the Sherman Act, this would create perverse incentives for
interest groups in the state and local lawmaking process. It would allow
select, powerful private interests to lobby lawmakers for a delegation
under clear statutory language (however broad) and then engage in
conduct that completely escapes the scrutiny of both agency regulators and
courts--even where the conduct would otherwise be anticompetitive under
the Sherman Act. If courts reduce state-action immunity to foreseeability
under Hallie, based on implied legislative intent,236 state-action immunity
has the same potential result. By encouraging firms to lobby for antitrust
exclusion in state legislation, state-action immunity can have harmful
forum selection effects. For example, a state restructuring plan that
envisions a scheme of competitive restructuring as displacing antitrust
enforcement could eviscerate the competitive norms of the antitrust laws,
regardless of how such a scheme actually organizes the industry and
monitors firm behavior. Antitrust federalism allows positive regulation by
decentralized governmental bodies, but it does not authorize raw state
repeal of federal antitrust law through ambiguous delegations or even
through plain language overrides of the Sherman Act.237 Thus, to the
extent the preference-eliciting default-rule interpretation of state-action
immunity eviscerates the active scrutiny requirement, it concedes too
much. This result is not required by judicial deference or antitrust
federalism, and may prove harmful to social welfare.

233. Id. at 1441-42.
234. See id. at 1442.
235. Id. at 1440 (quoting Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 736 (9th Cir.
1981)).
236. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
237. William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v.
Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 189 (1993).
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B. The Need for an Active-Supervision Inquiry
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Ticor, and the Ninth Circuit
embraced in Columbia Steel Casting, active supervision of state
regulators' conduct, as well as a clear statement of purpose, is required in
order to trigger state-action immunity from antitrust enforcement.2 38
However, many appellate courts remain astonishingly deferential 2to
test. 3 9
regulators in applying the active-supervision prong of the Midcal
Consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the context of
municipal regulation, these appellate courts effectively read out of stateaction-immunity analysis any serious scrutiny of regulatory supervision,
focusing instead on whether a decentralized legislative body has delegated
authority to supervise private conduct to an agency. In most cases,
potential supervision of conduct alone has been sufficient to trigger stateaction immunity from enforcement of the antitrust laws.24 °
However, judicial deference to regulatory power, or the potential for
regulation, without more invites interest group manipulation of the
regulatory forum for enforcement of competition law. For example, in the
context of electric power restructuring debates at the state level, firms
seeking immunity from the antitrust laws might lobby for delegation of
decisions regarding competitive access to essential facilities, as well as
pricing, to the regulator. It does not follow from a legislative delegation,
however, that the regulator has in fact exercised authority in ways that are
consistent with the pro-competitive goals of the Sherman Act. Allowing
state-action immunity to preclude antitrust enforcement in such
circumstances creates strong incentives for delegation to state regulators
with little or no guarantee that such authority is exercised in ways that
promote federalism or social welfare, let alone competition.
If anticompetitive conduct warrants any scrutiny under antitrust
federalism, appellate courts must depart from their current and past
practice of ignoring, or diluting, the active-supervision requirement. A
preference-eliciting default-rule approach is also useful in addressing this
aspect of Midcal.24 1 Rather than implying active supervision from the
historical fact of delegation, as most courts do, a general presumption
against active supervision would force litigants to present evidence of a

238. See supra notes 150-55, 230-31 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part II.B (discussing Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits).
240. For example, potential regulation by a utility commission was found by the Tenth Circuit to
be sufficient in Trigen, discussed supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
241. See Elhauge, supra note 226.
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pattern or regulatory activity and would elicit more explicit future
lobbying of regulators by monopolies. Put simply, an opportunity for
regulation is not the same as active supervision-although courts seem to
consistently reach this conclusion.242 The opportunity for regulation is a
first step of the active-supervision analysis, but it hardly concludes it.2 43 A
preference-eliciting default-rule approach also requires courts to assess
how frequently, and under what circumstances, supervisory authority is
exercised by regulators.
For example, the Second Circuit recently refused to extend state-action
immunity to an output cartel permitted by New York legislation
implementing a tobacco settlement.24 4 The legislation was clear and
express in its purpose to implement market share allocations in the sale of
cigarettes, but the Second Circuit criticized the state for failing to
articulate either a competitive or anticompetitive rationale for the
policy. 245 Regardless of whether the clear-articulation requirement had
been met, and whether the cartel was foreseeable under Hallie, the Second
Circuit refused to extend state-action immunity due to a lack of active
supervision, as is required by the second prong of Midcal.246 As the court
observed, neither the New York statutes, the settlement, nor any other
regulation envisioned active supervision of pricing under the cartel.2 47
Given "no mechanism" for reviewing the reasonableness of pricing
decisions or monitoring market conditions, 248 the court concluded "New
York has failed to provide for any state supervision, much less active
supervision, of the pricing conduct of cigarette manufacturers under the
anticompetitive market structure. 24 9 It further observed, "Absent such a
program of supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party's

242. See supra Part II.
243. Raising a similar concern, the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force states, "One
recurring problem involves the failure to distinguish between authorizing classes of activity and
forming state policy to displace competition." FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 26.
244. Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
245. Id. at 229-30. The court was not convinced by the health benefit claims made by the state in
the course of litigation, and observed that the only public discussion of the effect of the market-share
provisions was to increase prices and to discourage young people from smoking-the precise type of
cartel that the Sherman Act condemns. Id. at 230. In an order on rehearing, the court clarified: "the
court must find under this [clear-articulation] prong that the state did not inadvertently include
anticompetitive activities in some larger scheme. For this reason, it is important that a state enunciate
its intent to displace competition when it means to do so." Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 363 F.3d
149, 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (order on rehearing).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Freedom Holdings, Inc., 357 F.3d at 231.
249. Id. at 232.
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anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the
party's individual interests. 25 °
Recognizing the important role an active-supervision inquiry plays in
antitrust federalism, the Ninth Circuit has also refused to find state-action
immunity on this ground in the context of deregulated electric power
markets. The court allowed Snake River Valley Electric Association, an
electrical cooperative, to sue an investor-owned utility for anticompetitive
denial of access to essential transmission facilities, rejecting the utility's
claim to state-action immunity. 251 The utility argued that the state
regulatory scheme clearly envisioned the utility refusing to wheel-to the
extent the state had adopted a clear policy to displace competition among
electric suppliers-but the Ninth Circuit did not allow this to trigger
antitrust immunity. Under Idaho state law, the utility could decline the
customer's wheeling request without the substantive review of a state
agency or state courts, but the court reasoned that "[t]his is the type of
private regulatory power that the active-supervision prong of Midcal is
supposed to prevent. 253 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, while a selfpolicing regulatory scheme may qualify for state-action immunity without
active supervision,254 where the regulator has discretion to exercise active
supervision it is an appropriate object of inquiry for a court. Similarly,
perhaps signaling a departure from the deferential approach it previously
had embraced in the electric power context, 255 the Tenth Circuit refused to

extend state-action immunity to lock up telephone contracts procured by
Southwestern Bell that were "neither mandated, nor authorized, nor
reviewed, nor even known about by" state regulators.256
Cognizant of the potential gap that a low active-supervision threshold
can create, some lower courts recognize that active supervision "would be
satisfied if the state or state agencies held ratemaking hearings on a
consistent basis. 25 7 This is a good starting point for judicial analysis of the
application of antitrust laws in a restructured network environment. Courts
have a long history of allowing the existence of consistent ratemaking

250.
251.

Id. (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988)).
Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2001).

252. Id.
253.
254.
Co., 504
255.
256.

Id. at 1194.
Id. (citing Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344 n.6 (1987) and FTC v. Ticor Title Ins.
U.S. 621, 640 (1992)).
See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140 (10th Cir. 2002).

257. See Green v. People Energy Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,999 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(finding active supervision where lengthy hearings were held on gas supplier's rates on a consistent
basis).
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hearings at the state or local level to give rise to state-action immunity. In
Ticor, for instance, the Supreme Court found it relevant that the Wisconsin
state regulatory body had not held rate hearings prior to approving a
jointly filed insurance rate. 25 8 Thus, extending a presumption of stateaction immunity, and against judicial intervention, in the context of rate
hearings is appropriate.
Mere private contracts, however, do not meet this standard. For
example, an agency-approved contract provision prohibiting a customer
from entering into the electricity market as a competitor in the future,
offered by a utility in exchange for a discounted rate, is not protected by
state-action immunity. 259 For similar reasons, mere private filings of
contracts or tariffs with a regulatory agency, without active regulatory
scrutiny or oversight, would not meet the active-supervision requirement.
Without meaningful agency review of the specific private conduct at issue,
state-action immunity can be abused by private firms in a deregulatory
environment. 260 The factors that should guide courts in identifying active
supervision include how frequently agencies monitor private activities,
whether agencies have authority to enforce standards through the
imposition of penalties, and whether agencies have adequate resources to
engage in meaningful monitoring and enforcement. When in doubt, if a
regulatory system risks the imposition of spillover effects on nonparticipants, the presumption should be against invoking state-action
immunity.
In interpreting the active-supervision requirement, courts must be true
to the overall federalism purposes of state-action immunity. Fidelity to
federalism would not limit assessment of supervision to state regulation
only, but would also include other regulatory bodies, such as
municipalities. In addition, fidelity to federalism would require some
attention to the process which gives rise to regulatory supervision. If the
purposes of regulatory action overlap with the overall consumer welfare
goals of the Sherman Act, perhaps some degree of deference to
supervision by the state or local regulator is appropriate. However, if the
purpose is blatantly protectionist, in ways that do not even arguably

258. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 630 (1992).
259. United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172, 176 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
260. As the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force observes:
Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that
[clearly-articulated] regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion.
Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and
political responsibility for the conduct fairly be placed with the state.
FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 54.
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improve consumer welfare and that impose spillover costs on those in
other jurisdictions who have not participated in the process leading to the
adoption of regulation, intervention of the antitrust laws is entirely
appropriate. A preference-eliciting default rule would align private
incentives to ensure more explicit procurement of state-action immunity
via legislation and regulatory activity.
In contrast to the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit
correctly makes an affirmative finding of active supervision by the
regulator a predicate to any finding of state-action immunity, even in
deregulated markets. However, a more recent Ninth Circuit case
addressing state-action immunity in the very same antitrust claim
illustrates how readily the active-supervision prong will be undermined if
courts allow it to hinge entirely on the nature of the regulatory program
approved by a state legislature rather than on what regulators do in
implementing that program. 6 1 On the heels of the court's recognition that
there was no state-action immunity in the first Snake River Valley Electric
Association case, 262 the Ninth Circuit extended state-action immunity to
the same allegedly anticompetitive conduct.26 3 Following the first judicial
finding of no state-action immunity, which allowed antitrust litigation to
go forward, the Idaho legislature intervened by amending its Electric
Supplier Stabilization Act, under which the utility had previously declined
a wheeling request absent agency review. 264 The amendments allowed an
electric supplier to refuse to wheel power if the requested wheeling
"results in retail wheeling and/or a sham wholesale transaction," subject to
review of the state regulatory agency. 65 In addition, the Idaho legislature
prohibited competing suppliers from serving customers or former
customers of other electric suppliers unless the competing supplier
petitions26the
Idaho regulator and the regulator issues an order allowing the
6
service.

In reviewing this legislative intervention, the Ninth Circuit held that,
unlike the previous statutory arrangement, which left the decision not to
wheel entirely to private choice, the amended statute "has not left
unregulated a private preserve without competition" and thus meets the

261.
262.
263.
51 (9th
264.
265.
266.

See infra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. PacifiCorp (Snake River Valley I1), 357 F.3d 1042, 1048Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1048.
IDAHO CODE § 61-322D(1) (2002).
IDAHO CODE § 61-334B (2002).
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active-supervision requirement for state-action immunity.26 7 The Ninth
Circuit emphasized that the Idaho statute precluded a private utility from
wheeling without a contrary decision by the state regulator.268 The result
of this ruling is that statutes and regulations that prohibit competitive
conduct can eviscerate any active-supervision requirement.26 9 On this
approach, if a private firm is successful in lobbying for a statute that
prohibits it from engaging in competitive conduct, it would be immune
from antitrust challenge, even if that legislation occurs in the context of a
pending antitrust challenge. However, as the analysis of this Article
suggests, a court should not take a law prohibiting access to a network
facility at face value, but should carefully evaluate the scope of the
regulator's discretion to override any private choice to engage in
anticompetitive behavior, including the criteria the regulator is to apply in
making such a decision.
Revival of the active-supervision portion of judicial review as a type of
preference-eliciting default rule in state-action-immunity analysis does not
imply that courts should subject state and local regulation to strict scrutiny
review, as advocates of deference seem to imply. Rather, to make the
connection explicit, the type of judicial review called for in evaluating
state-action immunity is more akin to what courts provide under the
political process account of the dormant commerce clause. A focus on
agency monitoring and enforcement, along with the prospect of negative
spillover effects on non-participants, makes it more likely that these will
be taken into account in the state or local political process. Perhaps
mindful of the connection between these two legal doctrines-but without
drawing any explicit connection between them-the FTC's Report of the
State Action Task Force recommends "judicial recognition of the problems
associated with overwhelming interstate spillovers, and consider
such
' 27
spillovers as a factor in case and amicus/advocacy selection. 0
In terms of remedy, a failure to apply state-action immunity has less
significant consequences than other judicial review of legislation or
regulation. It does not result in condemning public conduct or necessarily
striking legislation but instead merely subjects private conduct to review
under the antitrust laws. If the type of regulation does not present veiled
wealth transfers-benign rent-seeking would not impair the political

267. Snake River Valley 11,357 F.3d at 1049.
268. Id. at 1050.
269. This was allowed by the Eleventh Circuit in TEC Cogeneration. See supra notes 175-77 and
accompanying text.
270. FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 14, at 56.
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process-private conduct that is supervised by the regulator generally
would be shielded from the scope of the Sherman Act. Rent-seeking that
thwarts the representative political process, however, would not be used
by private firms as a strategy to escape judicial review under the antitrust
standards of the Sherman Act. Such an approach preserves federalism
values by protecting the type of democratic participation that forms the
core of federalism. It also reduces the incentive for private interest groups
to quietly lobby state and local regulators in ways that allow state-action
immunity to become a private strategy for opting out of antitrust
enforcement in ways that impose spillover costs for those within a state or
local government who are not part of the lawmaking process.
CONCLUSION

More than two decades ago, a classic exchange between (now Judge)
Merrick Garland and Cass Sunstein debated the merits of courts engaging
in "hard look" review of agency decisions to deregulate industries. 27'
Judicial deference has an undeniably important place in public law
generally, including in the law of economic regulation. Under the Chevron
doctrine, which federal courts frequently invoke to defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of law,272 a federal agency's construction of its
jurisdictional statutes is generally upheld. Because deference to a federal
agency leads to national uniformity, judicial deference in reviewing
regulations involving federalism issues implicitly adopts a national
supremacy understanding of federalism. Courts have a general preference
for a federal supremacy approach to the resolution of jurisdictional battles
and for uniformity in their legal resolution.2 73 Most discussions of
deference in regulatory law focus on horizontal allocations of power,
between courts and regulatory agencies at the same' hierarchical level.
Certainly, however, vertical deference issues implicate a different set of
concerns, as constitutional law and antitrust federalism illustrate, and may
be at odds with the uniformity values promoted by horizontal deference.

271. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985)
(criticizing "hard look" review of agency decisionmaking); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulationand the
Hard-LookDoctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 177.
272. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As the
Supreme Court stated in Chevron, "an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments." Id. at 865.
273. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resourcesfor JudicialReview ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987),
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Public law has not adequately addressed the different kinds of judicial
deference at work in implementing competition policy. Restructuring of
network industries not only concerns the explicit choices of agency
regulators, but also the implicit opportunities the political and regulatory
processes provide for strategic private choices to manipulate public
regulation. Elsewhere, I have argued that judicial deference to private firm
rate filings, even involving federal agencies, does not enhance the goals of
competition and regulatory law absent judicial safeguards to protect
against strategic private tariffing. 27 4 Due to the regulatory-enforcement
void presented by gaps and concurrent jurisdiction, the "filed rate
doctrine" (a defense to private claims against utilities) did encourage
private firms to add terms to the regulatory contract that suit their private
interests, leading to particularly worrisome forum selection behavior
where regulators do not actively evaluate the content of tariffs. Strategic
forum shopping in tariff filing threatens to undermine competitive electric
power and telecommunications markets.275 For this reason, it may be
necessary for courts to evaluate the public interest in selection of an
enforcement forum in applying the filed tariff doctrine, rather than leave
this decision entirely within the realm of private choice.276
As this Article's analysis of the dormant commerce clause and stateaction immunity suggests, though, the bargaining problems presented by
gaps and concurrent jurisdiction are much broader than the issue presented
by tariffs and other private filings with regulatory agencies. Blanket
deference to state and local politics also fails to promote the goals of
regulatory law or competition policy. The temptation for judicial
avoidance, and judicial deference, is strong where complex technical
issues are under review, as in the context of electric power and
telecommunications regulation.27 7 A strong judicial deference stance
converges with the overall trend towards decentralization, popular among
many free market advocates,278 and punting an issue back to the state and

274. Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: JudicialEnforcement for a DeregulatoryEra,

56 VAND. L. REv. 1591 (2003) (arguing that courts should not embrace a broad presumption in favor
of the filed tariff doctrine).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1658-59. See also Jim Rossi, DebilitatingDoctrine, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Nov.
2004, at 16 (discussing problems with the filed-rate doctrine in the context of Texas's deregulated

electric power market).
277. See Garland, supra note 187; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial
Review ofAgency Rules: How FederalCourts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s,
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991).
278. Although, as is noted supra note 5, many leading scholars are skeptical of the ability of
decentralized regulatory processes to adequately sustain competitive interstate markets. While I do not
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local political process appeals to advocates of the new federalism.
However, as this Article argues, federal court deference to state and local
political processes results in seriously harmful effects for competitive
markets.
A bargaining-centered approach to economic regulation recognizes an
important role for state and local regulation, even in deregulated markets.
At the same time, due to the possibility of strategic private manipulation of
vertical (federal-state) bargaining space, blanket judicial deference to state
and local regulation in the contexts of the dormant commerce clause and in
the judicial gatekeeping function of applying state-action immunity to
antitrust claims ignores private incentives in decentralized lawmaking.
Further, as a focus on bargaining suggests, these two independent judicial
doctrines hold promise to improve the lawmaking process at the state and
local level if they are approached with similar goals in mind, rather than as
in tension. At their core, both doctrines share the goal of promoting
bargaining in the lawmaking process while minimizing private incentives
in state and local lawmaking that lead to overall reductions in social
welfare in the form of the imposition of spillover costs on those who do
not participate in the relevant lawmaking process.
In a leading article on the transformation of the law of regulated
industries, Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill predict that the courts will
play a fundamental role as economic regulation and competition policies
are reformulated.2 79 We need not relive the mistakes of the failed Lochner
era, but parallels in the dormant commerce clause and state-action
immunity lay seed for a common principle for courts to look to in
reviewing state and local regulations. Whether courts are invalidating
legislation, as in the context of the dormant commerce clause, or serving
as a gatekeeper for antitrust scrutiny, as in the context of state-action
immunity, the purpose in reviewing state or local political processes is the
same-to improve democratic lawmaking among and within the states.
Without such improvement, it is foolhardy to think that competitive
markets will thrive as formerly regulated markets are restructured at the
state and local, as well as the federal, levels of government.

disagree, I also am not optimistic that Congress can solve all of these problems on its own through
some sort of national legislation that preempts all state and local regulation. Given the likely failure of
Congress to act in a comprehensive and preemptive manner, public law has an important role to play
in improving decentralized lawmaking for competitive markets.
279. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1369 ("Although lacking the same policymaking
authority as Congress and regulatory commissions, the courts affect the pace, extent, or manner of
regulatory change each time they decide a case involving legislative or administrative regulatory
policies-whether they ratify, overturn, or require the government to reconsider a particular policy.").

